Reasons and Consequences for The Obama Administration's policy of Military Withdrawal in Iraq (2009-2017)

Mhran mirkhan hesen; Nawzad Abdullah Shukri

doi:10.25212/lfu.qzj.9.3.48

المؤلفون

Mhran mirkhan hesen International Relations, Soran University, Erbil, Iraq
Nawzad Abdullah Shukri Department of International Relations & Diplomacy, Salahaddin University-Erbil,Iraq

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25212/lfu.qzj.9.3.48

الكلمات المفتاحية:

Withdrawal, Military, Policy, Iraq, War

الملخص

In 2011, President Barack Obama announced a policy of military withdrawal from Iraq. This policy aimed to gradually withdraw the majority of US troops from Iraq and transition security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. During the campaign Barack Obama promised an end to the Iraq war. The policy was based on the belief that Iraq's security forces were capable of handling the country's security needs and that a long-term US military presence in Iraq was not necessary. this article attempts to explain several reasons and consequences of the withdrawal. The cost of the war had become unsustainable, the withdrawal started in August 2010, and all US military personnel had left Iraq by December 2011. The decision to withdraw was met with mixed reactions. Supporters argued that the war had become too costly, both in terms of lives and money, and that it was time for Iraq to take responsibility for its own security. Critics argued that a precipitous withdrawal could lead to instability and increased violence in Iraq. In the years following the withdrawal, Iraq experienced a surge in violence, including the Rise of ISIS and Intensifying the ethnic and sectarian conflict and Expansion of Shia militias group in Iraq and growing Iranian influence in Iraq.

التنزيلات

بيانات التنزيل غير متوفرة بعد.

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