



A Cognitive Grammatical Analysis of Inalienable Possessives in Orwell's "Animal Farm"

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ABSTRACT

The present paper focuses on investigating inalienable possessive constructions as a part of human experience of the world within the framework of cognitive grammar using Heine's (1997a, 1997b) model. The traditional approaches to language deal with the structure and meaning of possessive constructions as to be determined by a formal rule system and neglect their conventionalized cognitive structure. In English, a possessive construction conceptualizes a range of different semantic relations in a way that referring to all these meanings as "possessive" would be misleading. The paper aims at explaining an assumption that inalienable possessive expressions are combined in chain-like conceptual integration. The paper also focuses on explaining that the grammatical structure of inalienable possessives is predictable once people know the range of conventionalized cognitive structures from which they are derived. Another aim is to show that possession does have a privileged status in the semantics of other different concepts. One of the hypotheses is that the way the two component entities in different inalienable PCs are combined, depends on the conceptual structure of both entities (PR-PM). Another hypothesis is that there are certain highly abstract and complex concepts in the mind of speaker that grammar cannot conceptualize. Such complex concepts are generally structuralized by the structures of some other concrete concepts, which are the event schemas. The paper concludes

that the grammatical structures of the randomly occurring possessives are built via the conceptual correspondence between the possessor and possessum with the ability to project concrete concepts onto other less concrete concepts.

1. Introduction

Although the idea of possession would seem to be self-evident, an adequate semantic description of possessive relationships has been proved elusive. The term “possessive” should not always be identified too closely with ideas of relational possession or ownership because possessive constructions (PC hereafter) are used to conceptualize many other concepts that are not core possession at all (Albayati, 2014, p.83). The analysis of these many different concepts structuralized through PC could not be predicted on the basis of the sorts of rules found in grammar books. The traditional approaches show that the process of “understanding the possessive expressions” can be determined by a formal rule system or that the different semantic relations expressed by a PC is just a matter of homonymy and neglect their conventionalized cognitive structure. In an example of specifically syntactic knowledge “Max’s car”, speakers recognize the phrase as having a correct and typical grammatical structure of someone possesses something material, but the phrase conceptualizes other concepts that are nearly autonomous of the syntactic structure of the phrase, that is thought to be used for only notional possession. What is in the mind is not always conceptualized via grammar. Grammarians fail to offer any satisfactory explanations of how one and the same morpheme is used by English native speakers to conceptualize a number of diverse semantic relations. Those linguists who are new to cognitive grammar find it very challenging and confusing to know why the actual PC, e.g. “John’s hat” (the hat that John owns), and those structures which only superficially resemble basic PC, e.g. “a doctor’s degree” (a doctoral degree) are structured identical to each other, but convey different concepts (Nikiforidou, 1991, p.150).

There are three main research questions in the paper, they are as follows:

1. How and why there are highly diverse semantic relations that are structuralized through basic PC only, but not by any other nominal structures?
2. What does a PC actually mean; what sort of meaning it carries typically that is used for all the kinds of relationships?
3. Why the structure of inalienable PCs can be traced back to other domains of human experience, which are more concrete?

1.1 The Models Adopted

In the present paper, two models are to be adopted. The analysis of a range of different possessive semantic relations in the selected novel is based on Heine's (1997a, 1997b) account of PCs. The researchers also use Lakoff's (1977) and Brown's (1973) models only for those possessive semantic relations that Heine's model fails to account for. The researchers use Lakoff's model in the uncategorized PCs to support what the researchers have explained.

1.2 The Procedures

The procedures that are followed in conducting this paper are as follows:

1. Identifying and explaining the theoretical background of the assumptions of cognitive linguistics and cognitive grammar as well as taking into account the explanation of PCs in the light of cognitivists' theories, such as reference-point construction, Event Schemas, and experiential gestalt.
2. Classifying the collected data of PCs extracted from Orwell's novel. The researchers analyze the various inalienable possessive structures in terms of Heine's inalienability and event schemas. At the end of the practical section, the collected data are represented statistically.

1.3 The Scope of the Research

The study tries to introduce and analyze English inalienable PCs, only, in one selected modern English novel by the renowned novelist, George Orwell from a cognitive grammatical point of view using Heine's (1997a, 1997b) model. The researcher deals with PCs only at phrasal level.



1.4 The Data

The examples cited in the theoretical sections are essentially taken from cognitive books. The researchers have added their own examples where necessary and modified few examples were relevant. In addition, the data of the analysis are all the texts and examples of the modern and authentic British English language novel “Animal Farm”.

1.5 The Significance of the Research

The paper is beneficial for linguistic students and non-native speakers, who are new to cognitive approach and are interested in studying natural language English, so they can be familiarized of how it is that a morpheme, one of whose uses is to denote possession, can also, in other contexts, denote other various semantic relations. The findings of the analysis in the paper are of great guide to other linguistic researchers both within and beyond the field of cognitive linguistics. To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, there has not been a comprehensive study of inalienable PCs in the light of cognitive grammar, so this paper is of massive importance to fill in this gap. Additionally, explaining why the various PCs are structured the way they are can play an important role in text understanding that is why the study might be a positive means for non-native literary critics to have a clearer view in interpreting texts with PCs.

2. Cognitive Linguistics: A Theoretical Background

Cognitive linguistics (CL hereafter) is a relatively new school of linguistics, and one of the most innovative approaches to the study of language and thought that has emerged within the modern field of interdisciplinary study known as cognitive science in the late 1970s in the United States. CL is one of the fastest growing and influential perspectives on the nature of language, the mind, and embodied experience (Evans, Bergen, & Zinken, 2007, p.2).

CL grew out of the work of a number of most prominent and outstanding figures of this approach, like Langacker, Fillmore, Heine, Chafe, Lakoff, Fauconnier, and Talmy who were very interested in the relation of language to mind, and who did not follow the widespread tendency of attempting to segregate syntax from the rest of other



language components, the line of research followed instead was to analyze the relation of language structure to things outside language, including principles of human categorization, concepts, pragmatic and interactional principles, and functional principles in general (Malmkjar, 2010, p.61).

Evans et al. (2007) argued that CL is a broad theoretical and methodological enterprise, rather than a single, closely articulated theory that is why it is best described as a “movement” or an “enterprise” (Evans, et al., 2007, p.3). As stated by Lee (2001), in the early years cognitive linguists tended to define their model in opposition to the theory of Generative Grammar (GG hereafter). The leading scholars in the movement were themselves trained as generative grammarians and elaborated the cognitive model out of what they thought to be shortcomings of generative theory. In fact, the main feature that distinguishes CL from GG has a lot to do with the place of meaning in the theory (Lee, 2001, p.1).

Saeed (2013) claimed that “cognitive linguists share the functionalist view” (p.356). This means that CL belongs to the functionalist tradition, but as Evans and Green (2006) noted “one point that makes functional approach different from CL is that it tends to be less concerned with the psychological representation of language as a system of knowledge and is more concerned with language use” (p.759). Within functionalism, CL stands out by emphasizing the semiological function of language and the crucial role of conceptualization in social interactive (Langacker, 1998, p.1). GG built a view of language which made very strong commitments about the primacy of syntax, disregarding the role of semantics and pragmatics in linguistic theorizing, this went for behaviorists as well, who believed that studying semantics while dealing with linguistic structures, is a weak point in studying language. This was considered highly inappropriate for many authors, who, like Langacker (1987), thought that:

Meaning is what language is all about; the analyst who ignores it to concentrate solely on matters of form severely ruins the natural and necessary subject matter of the discipline and ultimately distorts the character of the phenomena described. (p.12)

Haiman (1985, as cited in Barcelona &Valenzuela, 2011, p.19) noted that to cognitive linguistics, concepts, including linguistic concepts, are ultimately grounded in experience whether it is a bodily, physical, social, or cultural experience. This is thus apparently in conflict with an axiom in twentieth century linguistics; that of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign. This insistence on embodiment and motivation explains the important role accorded to linguistic iconicity (Sinha, 2007, p.1267). From the perspective of CL all the parts of language are in constant communication, and indeed are not parts at all; they are a unified phenomenon operating in unison with the greater phenomena of general consciousness and cognition (Janda, 2010, p.6). Evans et al. (2007) pointed out that CL takes a vertical, rather than a horizontal approach to the study of language. Language can be seen as composed of a set of layers of organization (like layers of a cake), as it is shown in the adapted Figure 1 below (Abdullah, 2019, p.8). Vertical approaches get a richer view of language by taking a vertical slice of language, which includes all the linguistic levels all together, but it affords possible explanations that are simply unavailable from a horizontal, modular perspective (Evans et al., 2007, p.4).




Figure (1): Language levels compared to layers of a cake: Cognitive approaches to language study (based on Evans et al., 2007, p.4)

2.1 The Cognitive Commitment

The hallmark of cognitive linguistics is the cognitive commitment (CC hereafter) which represents the view that principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines, particularly the other cognitive sciences, such as philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence and neuroscience. In other words, it is this commitment that makes cognitive linguistics cognitive, and thus it forms an approach that is fundamentally interdisciplinary in nature. It follows from the CC that language and linguistic organization should reflect general cognitive principles rather than cognitive principles that are only specific to language (Evans & Green, 2006, pp.40-41).

3. Cognitive Grammar: From Thought to Language

Cognitive grammar (CG hereafter) is a theoretical grammatical approach for representing linguistic structure and meaning. It was formerly called “space grammar”, and was developed by Ronald Langacker in 1976s, and is best represented in his two volumes of *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*. It is also arguably the most detailed and comprehensive theory of grammar to have been developed within cognitive linguistics, and to date has been the most influential. It has achieved a substantial measure of internal coherence (Evans et al., 2007, p.24).

It is worth saying that the efforts made in CG theory have been promoted by the feeling that former established theories fail to come to grips in any sensible way with the real problems of language structure, as they are based on interlocking sets of concepts, attitudes, and assumptions that misconstrue the nature of linguistic phenomena and thus actually hinder people’s understanding of them. It is therefore necessary to start and raise a theory on very different conceptual foundations. The differences it has with the traditional approaches reach to the level of philosophy and organizing assumptions; that is to say, the differences concern the nature of linguistic investigation, the nature of a linguistic system, the nature of grammatical structure, and the nature of meaning (Langacker, 1988, p.3).

Langacker’s (1987) results indicated that CG diverges from standard assumptions in two fundamental respects (Langacker, 1987, p.11):

1. CG claims that grammar is symbolic in nature, so it is inherently meaningful; thus it is conceptualized.
2. CG focuses on constructions (rather than “Set of rules”) as the primary objects of description entrenched in social interactions.

3.1 The Nature of Language: The Symbolic Thesis

CG is driven by the idea that language is essentially and inherently symbolic in nature. It makes available to the speaker to communicate in either personal or communicative use. Language is an open-ended set of linguistic signs or expressions, each of which associates a semantic representation of some kind with a phonological representation. The symbolic nature of language follows the centrality of meaning to virtually all linguistic concerns (Langacker, 1987, p.11).

According to the symbolic processing view that Greeno and Moore (1993) advocated, symbols are fundamentally involved in all cognitive activity. Every account of cognitive phenomena consists of a set of operations that construct and modify symbolic structures; that is, every cognitive process is a symbolic process. A symbolic expression is a structure either physical or mental that is interpreted as a representation of something. This use of the term symbol is consistent with a long tradition in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. They also asserted that symbolic processing is not the most important thing, but it is the only thing in discourse context to make sense of the things (Greeno & Moore, 1993, pp.50-51).

Evans and Green (2006) pointed out that this first guiding assumption holds that the fundamental unit of grammar is a form-meaning pairing or symbolic unit which is also called a “symbolic assembly” in Langacker’s CG framework. In Langacker’s terms, the symbolic unit has two poles: a semantic pole; its meaning, and a phonological pole; its sound (Evans & Green, 2006, p.476).

Taylor (2002) explained clearly that, the central concept of CG, “actually amounts to little more than the claim that language is in essence a means for relating sound and meaning” (p.20). He also said that according to symbolic thesis, any linguistic expression, whether this be a single word, a morpheme, a phrase, a sentence, or even an entire text, has the organization shown in the adapted Figure 2 below (Taylor, 2002, p.21):




Figure (2): The three elements of a linguistic expression

3.2 The Usage-Based Thesis

The most important concept underlying usage-based approaches to linguistics is the usage event. A usage event is an “utterance”. There is a definition of the term “utterance” provided by Croft (2001), one of the leading proponents of the usage-based approach (as cited in Evans & Green, 2006, pp.109-110):

An utterance is a particular, actual occurrence of the product of human behavior in communicative interaction; a string of sounds, as it is pronounced, grammatically structured, and semantically and pragmatically interpreted in its context.

As this statement indicates, an utterance is culturally and contextually embedded and represents an instance of linguistic behavior on the part of a language user (Evans & Green, 2006, p.110). Langacker (1991) asserted that “CG ascribes to language an organization that is both natural and minimal granted its communicative function of allowing conceptualization to be symbolized by phonological sequences” (p.1).

A usage event has a unit-like status in that it represents the expression of a coherent idea, making use of the conventions of the language; the norms of linguistic behavior in a particular linguistic community. Utterances typically occur spontaneously. Utterances represent specific and unique instances of language use. According to GG, performance can be affected by language-external factors, so that performance often fails to adequately reflect competence; that is, the usage level would be epiphenomenal. In direct opposition to this view, cognitive linguists argue that

knowledge of language is derived from and informed by language use. In addition, in usage-based theories of language change, motivations for linguistic development and language change are always functional and rise from language use and communicative needs in the settings of the symbolic structure, that is, the conventionalized form-meaning pairings (Evans & Green, 2006, pp.110-111).

3.3 Conceptual Frames

As Geeraerts (2006) pointed out, frame semantics is the specific approach to natural language semantics developed by Fillmore. One essential starting point is the idea that one cannot understand the meaning of a word or a linguistic expression in general without access to all the encyclopedic knowledge that relates to that word (Geeraerts, 2006, p.15). Conceptual frames are larger coherent packages of knowledge that are prompted with every word. Like domains, frames are evoked, but unlike domains, they are not characterizing⁹. The mention of any one of the elements of a frame activates in human's mind the whole frame. Frames make situations meaningful and allow people to make inferences (Radden, 2006, p.396).

Human knowledge of frames enables people to understand the coherent nature of things in which each part has its place and function within its global structure. Their shared knowledge of frames also governs communication. For instance, in sentences (1) below, people immediately know that a particular main part or parts of a car are meant, although only the car as a whole is named (Radden & Driven, 2007, p.10). People's knowledge of the "car" frame, for example, allows them to understand the use of *car* in *Can you start the car?* in the sense of its active zone "engine of the car":

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| (1) <i>Whole</i> | <i>Parts</i> |
| b. Can you start <i>the car</i> ? | [<i>engine of the car</i>] |
| c. Can you wash <i>the car</i> ? | [<i>body of the car</i>] |

The engine and the body are the parts of the car that are directly and crucially involved in each of the situations described under (1). Such parts of a whole are known as an entity's active zone. In fact, this way of speaking comes to people so naturally that they have to think twice before they realize that they are not using the words at their surface value (Radden & Driven, 2007, p.11).

4. A Cognitive Account of PCs

In many accounts of how PCs are shaped by cognitive measure, Langacker's (1987, 1995), Heine's (1997a, 1997b), and Lakoff (1977) model represented that a range of different semantic relations of PCs have an experiential basis that are originally rooted from the structures of concrete or less abstract concepts. These concrete concepts are strongly shaped by experience since birth and incorporate substantial conceptual content for complex and abstract concepts, for which there is no grammatical structure for conceptualizing them (Langacker, 1995, p.52; Heine, 1997a, p.90).

4.1 “Rules” versus “Schemas”

The single most important theoretical concept in traditional and formal linguistics is the rule. CG is a usage-based, not a rule-based, theory. The CG unit of analysis that most readily corresponds to “rule” is “schema”. Kant (as cited in Sinha, 2007, p.1270), who was the first to employ the term in the context of cognitive representation saying that “Indeed, it is schemas, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts...the concept “dog” signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner”, without limitation to any single determinate figure (Sinha, 2007, p.1270).

Schemas are structures of the imagination, and imagination is the mental faculty that mediates all judgment; hence, imagination is the faculty for forming different modes of representation (sensory percepts, images, concepts, and so on) into concepts. The notion of schema is something like “rationality without rules” a way of relating percepts to concepts (Langacker, 1987, pp.132-133).

4.2 Valence Relation

Nominal possessive expressions are neither integrated at random nor conditioned by formal rules. The integration of the subparts of a composite structure is governed by valence determinants and conceptual relations. Valence is the capacity of two structures to combine. One significant determinant resides in the phonological and semantic compatibility between the subparts of an expression. Every construction

whether lexical or grammatical is characterized as an assembly of symbolic structures (Langacker, 2009,p.2).

In every relational prediction, one of the profiled participants in the relation has the status of trajectory (TR hereafter); the TR is the more salient entity, from whose perspective the relation is viewed. The less salient entity is the landmark (LM hereafter), which serves as a reference point for the specification of the TR (Taylor, 1989, p.672).

4.3 Reference-Point Model

The speaker makes use of a reference-point cognitive model, which serves as a kind of “mental bridge” allowing the hearer to access the referent. An element is selected as a reference point because it is especially prominent and salience in cognition or because it comes before other elements in the linear string in daily usage (Langacker, 1995, p.58).

On the reference-point analysis, the possessor (PR hereafter) nominal names a reference point entity, which the speaker introduces as an aid for the subsequent identification of the target entity, denoted by the possessum (PM hereafter). Not every nominal is equally suited to serve as a reference point; the nominal serves as a reference point must have certain properties. Indeed, the nominal reference point has to have a topic status in the sense that “the thing or person about which something is said”, in contrast a target entity has to have a “comment” status, which denotes that which is said about the topic; people cannot comment if there is no specific topic to comment on. So, nominal reference point is semantically independent and has high cue validity (Taylor, 1996, p.208).

The open-ended variety of relationships coded by PCs reflects the ubiquity of the reference-point phenomenon. Using one entity to establish mental contact with another is a fundamental aspect of cognitive organization (Langacker, 1995, p.59).One can find clear examples of reference point (initial focus or starting point) chains in certain possessive and locative constructions. Consider the following chain of examples (Langacker, 1998, p.29):

(2) a. Tom’s mother’s cousin’s friend’s lover’s psychiatrist.

b. Your keys are downstairs, in the study, on the desk.

In (2a), a focus chain leads from Tom, the starting point, to a particular psychiatrist, the ultimate target. Each possessor serves in turn as a reference point, in which capacity it evokes a dominion containing the possessed, which can then be put in focus as the next reference point. Similarly, the successive locatives in (2b) direct attention to smaller and smaller spatial areas, each of which contains the next, and thus affords mental access to it (1998, p.29).

The conceptualizer (C) first directs attention to the entity serving as reference-point (R). Attending to R evokes a set of associated entities, collectively called its dominion (D), one of which is the target (T). A reference-point relationship is thus a matter of sequenced mental access, where directing attention to R makes it possible to then direct attention to T, as it is shown in Figure 3 below (Langacker, 2009, p.82).




Figure (3): The mental process in reference-point construction

3.4 Meaning and PCs: Language as a Shaper of Thought

In CG, grammar is described as an image, because like lexicon, grammar provides the structure and symbolization of conceptual content. When people use a particular construction, they choose a particular image to structure the conceived situation for communicative purposes that is why possessive expressions are always semantically motivated (Langacker, 1986, p.13). Langacker (1987, pp, 46-56) stated that grammatical structure is almost entirely overt. Surface grammatical form does not

conceal a truer, deeper level of grammatical organization; rather, it itself embodies the conventional means a language employs for the structuring and symbolization of semantic content. So he declared that no linguistic phenomenon is semantically empty. Meaning, however, is neither objectively given nor can it be captured through precisely formal description.

According to Evans (2009) “meaning is not a property of the constructions in language, rather...meaning arises as a function of the way words and language are arranged by language users in socio-culturally, and physically contextualized communicative events” (p.22). For instance, when someone says *women’s digging stick*, here the speaker conceptualizes the concept through a conventionalized cognitive structure, that is a typical PC, to conceptualize the concept that has nothing to do with someone possesses something; the concept of the phrase is too complex and abstract for which there is no grammatical structure from the set of formal rules. So, speakers through conceptual affinity use the same structure of typical possession to facilitate the structuralization of the too complex concept. The phrase means a stick that was used in the past by women only. Thus, semantics determines syntactic structure not the set of rules grammarians described (Evans, 2009, p.22).

4.4 Lakoff’s (1977) Model of Possessives

The basic claim of experiential linguistics, as Lakoff (1977, p.237) proposed, is that a wide variety of experiential factors, such as perception, reasoning, the nature of the body, the emotions, memory, social structure, sensorimotor and cognitive development determine in large measure, if not totally, universal structural characteristics of language. Basic and concrete concepts of existence, possession, accompaniment, and location are perceived through language use and thus are highly abstracted in language to work as constructional schemas for structuralizing other abstract concepts. Once a schema is formed, it focuses people’s attention on aspects of the schema as experienced by assimilating, accommodating or rejecting aspects which do not conform (Renstch, Mot & Abbe, 2009, p.3).

Consider the utterance “There is a bike, it is Maria’s, but she doesn’t have it, it is in the store.” The utterance contains four predications, and each is associated with a different concept or schema: *There is a bike* is referred to “existence” (*Y exists* or

There is Y), it is Maria's of Equation (Y is X's), she doesn't have it of Possession (X has Y), and it is in the store of Location (Y is at X). The claims made in Heine's works are as follows (1997b, pp.202-203; Bentley et al., 2013, pp.1-2):

1. Possessive, existential and locative constructions are related to one another. Possessive expressions are the result of grammaticalization, i.e. of a process whereby a concrete schematic content is employed for the expression of a more abstract function.
2. They are related by the fact that these constructions exhibit the same rule behavior in certain uses.
3. Possessive expressions are locative in their underlying structure, that is, the relationship between all these constructions is a result of their shared underlying locative structure.
4. It is easy to trace a connection between location and possession; situations in which objects are always or often close to a person invite the implicature that they belong to that person, that is, the PM is typically described as being, existing or located at the location and in the proximity of the PR.

4.5 Heine's (1997a,1997b) Model of PCs: Event Schemas

A schema is a mental model that can serve an organizing function by specifying relationships between concepts, which facilitates pattern detection. Schemas are dynamic and shift in response to specific experiences or new information encountered (Rentsch et al., 2009, p.3). Event schemas are like stereotypes of events or situations with which people are constantly confronted, akin to "conceptual metaphor", "image schemas", or "domains" (Heine, 1997a, pp.90-91). Langacker (1978) related these event schemas to the notion of proposition which he defined it as "a simple semantic unit consisting of predicate and associated variables" (p.857). Though both types of PCs: attributive and predicative possessives are conceptually rooted in the same source domains, there are differences in the frequency with which a certain schema, or template, occurs for one or the other type of PC, that is, not all of the schemas are used for all kinds of PCs. Note that both genitive and equation schemas are already possessive expressions (Heine, 1997a, p.91). The structure of the

relevant schema is reflected in the syntax of the construction. Consider the following examples (1997a, pp.95-96):

1. **[Action Schema]**,
(3) The man has the car. (Lit.: “the man has **taken** the car.”)
(4) Julia has the house. (Lit.: “Julia has **ruled** the house.”)
2. **[Location Schema]**,
(5) Edward’s glasses. (Lit.: “The glasses at Edward’s home.”)
(6) Berlin’s opera houses. (Lit.: “There are three opera houses in Berlin.”)
3. **[Companion Schema]**,
(7) John’s telescope. (Lit.: “John was there with a telescope.”).
(8) The man’s red nose. (Lit.: “The man with a red nose.”)
4. **[Genitive Schema]**,
(9) He has a wife. (Lit.: “His wife exists.”)
5. **[Goal Schema]**,
(10) I have a rope. (Lit.: “A rope exists for me.”)
(11) Toby’s child. (Lit.: “A child exists for Toby.”)
6. **[Source Schema]**,
(12) His habit. (Lit.: “Take that habit out from him”)
(13) France’s late advices. (Lit.: “Late advices from France.”)
7. **[Topic Schema]**,
(14) The farmer’s house. (Lit.: “As for the farmers, house exists.”)
8. **[Equation Schema]**,
(15) The car is mine. (Lit.: “The car belongs to me.”)

4.5.1 Grammaticalization

According to Heine (1997b), grammaticalization is a process whereby a linguistic expression, in addition to its conventional meaning, receives a more abstract and more grammatical meaning, that is, source schemas such as Location, action, companion, or goal serve as templates or metaphorical vehicles for refereeing to possession. With a kind of metaphorical extension that does not arise as a spontaneous act of transfer from one domain of conceptualization. The driving force behind this kind of metaphorical extension is context extension. At the initial stage, the expression concerned exclusively denotes the literal meaning of the source schema. Subsequently, the expression is increasingly used in contexts which allow for

a possessive interpretation until this interpretation becomes the primary and, eventually, the conventional one. The expression can be interpreted exclusively with reference to possession (Heine, 1997b, pp.76-77).

4.5.2 Inalienable PCs in “Animal Farm”

This section is the practical section that analyzes inalienable PCs in Orwell’s *Animal Farm*. Practically, it shows how meaning differences expressed by PCs can frequently occur in different contexts of use. The cognitive explanations and theories provided in the above sections were applied in the analysis of the PCs. Heine’s model was adopted for scrutinizing the range of different meanings of PCs by providing for each instance an event schema. The conceptual integration of component structures for each instance is also analyzed based on Heine’s inalienability. Then, a group of possessive structures that Heine could not classify are analyzed relying mainly on Lakoff’s (1977) model. Finally, the analyzed data is shown statistically to represent the rate of frequency for each semantic relation in the novel.

According to Heine’s (1997a,1997b) classification of different possessive semantic relations, first and foremost class of inalienable possessives is of familial and relative PCs. In kinship possessive concepts, the PR and PM concepts are so close to the extent that they are perceived as inseparable entities. In *Animal Farm*, there occurs only one instance of nominal kinship possessive, which is taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.15):

(16) The pigs now revealed that during the past three months they had taught themselves to read and write from an old spelling book which had belonged to **Mr. Jones’s children** and which had been thrown on the rubbish heap.

In example (16), there is a close conceptual link between the PR *Mr.Jones* and inalienable PM *children*. Generally, humans’ cognitive ability reflects a great conceptual closeness of someone being close and relative to someone else. To identify individuals as *children* is to make implicit reference to *Mr.Jones*, to whom the designated *children* stand in an un-profiled kinship relationship.

The hearer, on encountering kinship possessives, does not first try to conceptualize the PR's dominion, only then to select just that entity that the speaker intends to convey. Moreover, the hearer takes note of the semantic character of the PM, and then, given the identity of the PR, attempts to identify the PM in terms of a semantic relation that can hold between the PR and PM.

The most appropriate event schema that gives rise to the example (16) is Accompaniment Schema. There is a conceptual affinity between concepts of the kinship possessive relations and companion "being with" concept. This affinity leads to the morphosyntactic restructuring of the kinship PC. In accompaniment construction "X is with Y", the PR *Mr.Jones* is encoded as the subject and the PM *children* are represented as comitative complements. The PM is both concrete and dynamic, and this paves the ground for better conformity to Companion Schema. When people utter an utterance, like "here comes Mr.Jones with children", one can readily infer that the *children* that the speaker means are those *children* who refer to *Mr.Jones*. *Children* are permanent accompaniments of their father wherever and whenever they are seen walking together.

As for Topic Schema "as for X, Y exists", *Mr.Jones* is seen as a kind of theme, it appears as a topic constituent in initial position and serves as a possessive modifier of the *children*; the possessive relationship is established by asserting the existence of the *children* in relation to the topicalised PR *Mr.Jones*. As far as *Mr. Jones* is concerned, there are *children*. Of course, this possessive kinship expression can be reworded by means of [NP PP] expressions, often with little semantic difference to facilitate its conceptualization in communication by means of the structure of other concrete concepts of both accompaniment and existential constructions.

The second class of inalienable possessives is of body-Parts PCs. According to CG, in conceptualizing a part of a body, speakers have to conceptualize a part in relation to a body, because a part can hardly be conceived without the whole. A body part has to be conceptualized with respect to the whole body or the body's owner. A part is thought to represent the whole, and the whole is intrinsic enough to the conceptualization of the part. The following two examples illustrate this case, they are taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.54):

- (17) **The pigs’ ears** were bleeding, the dogs had tasted blood, and for a few moments they appeared to go quite mad.

In example (17), there is an iconic motivation between the two entities (PRs-PMs); the PMs *ears* cannot appear independently of the PRs *pigs*, because in body-part concepts the two entities are inherently relational, that is, people from their cognitive ability, which is strengthened by experiencing the world around them, know very well that body parts are related to the domain of BODY. Without understanding the body system, people would not be able to use and conceptualize *ears* in relation to the body. This basically shows that meaning is encyclopedic, and that lexical concepts cannot be understood independently of larger knowledge structures, which means that they are from the normal and communicative use of language this is the reason why studying and analyzing linguistic structures in the light of CG is a usage-based type of analysis.

There is a compatibility of meaning between the part and the body, and this compatibility facilitates their integration to form a more complex whole. Most importantly, the semantics of both the part and the bodie determine their integration, and their semantics show the inherent inseparability of meaning between the two entities. A conceptual integration between the two predications (body and part/ *pigs* and *ears*) is possible just in case these predications overlap, in the sense that some substructure within one corresponds to a substructure within the other and is construed as identical to it.

Taking event schemas into account, Accompaniment Schema is the most compatible conceptual template for body-part PCs. Accompaniment pattern gives rise to the structure of the example in (17); in companion construction “he is with cat” for example, the PRs *pigs* are presented as the subjects and the PMs *ears* are comitative complements. In other words, in companion form, the PMs are the dynamic and concrete entities that accompany the PRs, and the PRs are the entities that are accompanied by. Having said that, the body parts are with the *pigs*; wherever they go, the parts accompany them permanently. In the minds of speakers, the conceptual structure of “being with” has a concrete identity, and thus this concrete type of

meaning functions as a conceptual template to conceptualize the structure of less concrete example in (17). This conceptual transfer from a concrete concept to the less concrete concept happens only if there is some kind of similarity in meaning between the two concepts this is the reason why in CG, meaning has the highest value of significance.

The third type of inalienable possessives is of relational spatial concepts. The following is an example illustrating such concept, which is taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.68):

- (18) The animals chased them right down to **the bottom of the field**, and got in some last kicks at them as they forced their way through the thorn hedge.

The concept of *bottom* is the dependent conceptual structure; it does not have independent existence except as a spatial concept of *the field*. The dependent structure is relational and includes within its profile an entity, specifically a thing, which corresponds to the profile of the autonomous structure of *the field*. Thus, in this spatial composite structure concept, the autonomous one has high cue validity and informativeness to function as the reference point for the identification and specification of the spatial concept. *The field* elaborates the LM of *bottom*, which is the TR.

Example (18) has its original meaning from predicates whose original meaning has a lot to do with the Source Schema. The example is a derivative of this schema. According to possession-as-non-possessive hypothesis, the linguistic representation of source construction provides the basis for the linguistic representation of other abstract and complex concepts as possession in (18), and this happens because of the occurrence of some aspects of similarity at the conceptual level between the concrete concept of Source Schema and abstract spatial relational concepts. In Source Schema “Y exists from X”, the PM *the bottom* as a spatial concept is encoded as the subject, whose existence depends on the focal source from which they originally come out, and the PR *the field* is the focal source function and have the prepositional ablative source function “(away) from” or “out of”. When someone says “there is a bottom

part out of the field”, it is as if they described *the field* as having *the bottom* as a spatial part.

According to Heine’s (1997a), the forth class of inalienable possessives is of intrinsic parts of items. In expressing an intrinsic part of an item or a thing, both a PR and PM, in most of the cases, are inanimate entities, and the type of relationship between them is of part-whole relation. Within CG, the meaning of linguistic units, such as the parts and the items, can only be characterized relative to a person’s background knowledge. The components of background knowledge specifically invoked by a linguistic unit constitute the “base” or “scope of predication” against which a linguistic unit profiles the entity which it designates. The following example illustrates this class of inalienable PCs, which is taken from Orwell, (1945/2013, p.45):

- (19) ...Boxer would even come out at nights and work
 for an hour or two on his own by **the light of the
 harvest moon.**

In (19), the inherent part *the light* profiles conceptual dependency for being a part of something. Even though the PM does not designate to show this inherent relation, the notion of being an inherent part is nevertheless present in the semantic structure of the word. An example like this designates a whole-part relation which involves a strict close link between the two referent entities (*the light* and *the moon*). Speakers can hardly conceive *the light* as a part without the whole, which is conceptually autonomous, like *the moon* that is why the part has to be conceptualized and identified with reference to the whole; otherwise, it cannot be referred to and conceptualized while communicating with others. The conceptual structure of both the part and the whole is completely compatible to form a composite structure, like *the light of the harvest moon*.

In this relational predication, the PM *the light* has the status of TR since its position is dynamic and the relation is viewed from its perspective to determine what kind of relation is conceptualized between the PR-PM. The PR *moon* is the LM, which serves as the reference point for the specification and identification of TR.

The concept of an inherent part of something in (19) is so abstract and complex to be conceptualized this is why when speakers come to express the concept, they try to find some aspects of similarity in meaning with other concrete concepts in their language, this is likely to result in morphosyntactic restructuring of the inalienable PC. *The light of the harvest moon* conforms its semantics and syntax to the Companion Schema of “being with” and “togetherness”, in a sense that the inherent abstract part, *the light* is encoded as comitative complement and *the moon* is encoded as the subject. In fact, when someone says “a moon with the light”, this basically gives the hearer a literal meaning of “the light that comes out from the moon”. The PM *the light* follows and accompanies the PR *the harvest moon* whenever *the moon* comes out in the sky at night. Both *the moon* and its *light* are seen together. This is the case, because people through their experience of the concrete notion “being with” can readily infer that the utterance uttered is interpreted as “the light that constitutes a part to the moon”.

The fifth types of inalienable possessives are physical and mental states. In these two types of concepts, the PMs are abstract properties, and are semantically dependent on the PRs, that are the experiencers. It is a requirement of the PMs that they be an abstract property of an individual or a thing. The below two examples illustrate these classes of inalienable possessives that are taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.48 and p.60), respectively:

(20) Squealer made excellent speeches on the joy of service and the dignity of labour, but the other animals found more inspiration in **Boxer’s strength** and his never-failing cry of ‘I will work harder!’

(21) He was always referred to in formal style as ‘our Leader, Comrade Napoleon,’ and this pigs liked to invent for him such titles as Father of All Animals, **Terror of Mankind,....**

In (20), the concept refers to a physical property that relates to *Boxer*. The conceptual structure of *strength* is non-intrinsic, thus it is conceptually dependent in

that the very notion of this relation necessarily makes reference to the entity that is related, which is *Boxer*. *Boxer* as the experienter of being strong is more intrinsic and informative for the conceptualization of his physical quality and property *strength*, because *Boxer* has an autonomous conceptualization and cue validity as well as high informativeness. If people want to check on the truth of *Boxer's* physical quality, they will look to *Boxer*, and enquire about his physical quality. *Boxer* serves as a reference point and thus a LM, because the more intrinsically one entity figures in the characterization of another, the more likely it is to be used as a reference point. In (21), the PM *terror* is the abstract property which is sometimes called stimulus. It characterizes the experienter *Mankind*, and the experience of a cognitive state is a better cue for the identification of the target than is the stimulus that causes the cognitive state. The experienter *Mankind* has the greater informativeness and intrinsicness in the conceptualization of the stimuli.

The complex concepts in (20) and (21) are originally derived from Source Schema. This essentially shows how human cognition works in shaping whatever concepts in the minds of speakers. In accordance with Source Schema “Y exists from X”, the experiencers *Boxer* and *Mankind* are encoded as the source functions, and the stimuli *strength* and *terror* are abstract properties coming out from the PRs, because the experiencers are the holders of such properties, and thus they exist from them. *Boxer* and *Mankind* are the sources from which the motion begins; one can claim that “strength exists from *Boxer*” and “there is terror from *Mankind*”, which essentially mean that “*Boxer* holds the strength” and “the terror out of the *Mankind*”. This conceptual transfer happens because of the semantic affinity between what it means when “something is available from someone” and “a physical or psychological state that relate to someone”.

According to the extra-linguistic explanations to the linguistic structure of concepts of physical and mental states in (20) and (21), the structure of these two phrases are also originally derived from the concrete construction of the Accompaniment Schema. In accordance with companion form, the PRs *Boxer* and *mankind* are encoded as the subjects and the PMs *strength* and *terror* are encoded as comitative complements following their holders probably for a lifetime. The physical and mental

properties of the individuals *Boxer* and *mankind* are necessary accompaniment of the individuals. The morphosyntactic reinterpretation of Companion Schema for the process of conceptual transfer provides a basis for the conceptualization of complex and abstract concepts of the phrases in (20) and (21). With having said that, in language production and comprehension, cognition plays a crucial role in producing and perceiving the linguistic structures.

According to CG, nominalized PC, which is the sixth class of inalienable possessives, can be conceptualized having two different semantic readings; subjective and objective readings. In principle, therefore, there are two elaboration sites in the noun's semantic structure, each of which is a candidate for elaboration by a PR nominal. Yet, it generally happens that one of the entities is a stronger candidate for elaboration than the other. Looking at the two examples below, one can propose that the PCs are semantically indeterminate and context-dependent this is why the informativeness of the reference point with respect to the target is not a fixed, invariant property, but may be modified by various contextual circumstances. Consider the examples below taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.85 and p.52), respectively:

(22) Sometimes the older ones among them racked their dim memories and tried to determine whether in the early days of the Rebellion, when **Jones's expulsion** was still recent, things had been better or worse than now.

(23) The animals were stupefied. This was a wickedness far outdoing **Snowball's destruction** of the windmill. But it was some minutes before they could fully take it in.

In example (22), the phrase conceptualizes an event happened to the PR, who is *Jones*. The semantic structure of *Jones* is that he is a human being and things can happen to him that is why *Jones* is a possible candidate for the PR of the deverbal PM expulsion. This semantic structure of *Jones* is so intrinsic or conceptually independent

to a conceptualization of the event *expulsion*. Thus, *Jones* as a LM is static and functions a reference point for the specification and identification of the event *expulsion*, which is the TR and is a matter of being dynamic, because one can conceptualize any other events that is happened to the same person *Jones* by referring to *Jones*. In fact, in conceptualizing an event related to someone, the event has to be identified in reference to that person; otherwise, it cannot be identified fully which event a speaker means. This conceptual dependency shows that the relation between the two entities is obligatory and inseparable.

In example (23), the phrase conceptualizes a participant in the event; *Snowball* is the one who is doing the action of destroying, so the semantic structure of the PR *Snowball* is conceptually dependent on the PM; the action *destruction*. The PR is also so informative and salient because it is *Snowball* who has done the action. So, people probably look to *Snowball*, and enquire him the pursue of *destruction* this is why *Snowball* is the TR. People can also conceptualize other people's actions. The PM *destruction* is conceptually autonomous and intrinsic for the identification and specification of *Snowball*, and that it serves as an optimal reference point as a LM in the possessive semantic relation.

The semantics and structure of examples in (22) and (23) are originally derived from Topic Schema. The structure and meaning of this schema are identical to existential "be" template. The meaning of both phrases is rooted from "the existence of something". In the topic form "as for X, Y exists", the PRs *Jones* and *Snowball* are topics appear in initial position and serve as possessive modifiers to the PMs *expulsion* and *destruction*, respectively. When one utters utterances, like "as for Jones, there exists an action of being expelled" and "as far as Snowball knows, there is a destruction", it is as if a speaker has said *Jones* and *Snowball* serve as a possessive modifiers and are themes who got indulged in these actions in one way or another. As for them these two actions do exist, basically because *Jones* is the one who has undergone the action and *Snowball* is the one who has done the action. The possessive relationship is established by asserting the existence of *expulsion* and *destruction* in relation to the topicalized *Jones* and *Snowball*.

4.5.3 The Data Collected from Inalienable Possessives

The following Figure represents the proportions of different classes of inalienable PCs occurred in Orwell's "Animal Farm". It shows that among the sub-categories of inalienable possessives, the relation of "inherent parts of other items" is the most frequently used semantic relation, which consists of 36% (= 151 structures) of the total of 416 structures, then comes the semantic relation of "physical and mental states", which consists of 19% (= 76 structures) of the total, and the minimum percentage is of "kinship terms" which consists of nothing (=1 structure) out of the total number of PCs in the novel. Basically, the results show that in people's social experience of the world, people encounter certain concepts that they find them difficult to structuralize because the set of grammatical rules they have in their minds cannot conceptualize some complex concepts the speakers might want to express. According to Heine's (1997a,1997b) concrete event schemas, these certain abstract and complex concepts are defined primarily with reference to their relative function in discourse. Heine's study on the nature and genesis of grammatical PCs suggested that possessive expressions do not emerge out of nothing; rather they are almost invariably derived from the domain of concrete concepts. Thus, the process of conceptual linkage between the concrete event schemas and the complex concepts takes place to build a structure for the kinds of complex and abstract concepts of PCs.

The Frequency of Inalienable Possessive Constructions




Figure (4): The distribution of inalienable possessive constructions in “Animal Farm”

It is worth mentioning that, there are many other inalienable concepts in the novel that do not fit under any of the six subcategories of inalienable PCs. So, Heine categorized such concepts under a special category of “OTHER” individual concepts. The concepts under this special category are related only to human beings.

5. PCs that Heine’s Model Failed to Categorize

There occur some other complex concepts in the novel that are structuralized through actual PC. The researchers call these concepts “uncategorized PCs” because they cannot go under any of the categories that Heine (1997b) proposes in his classification. They cannot also be put under the special category he calls “OTHER”. For the uncategorized PCs, it is hard to refer to their originality from the eight event schemas. They rather owe their genesis from the examples of typical PCs, and thus, have their originality from possession experiential gestalt.

The following example is of description possessive that is taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.82):

- (24) On the day appointed for the banquet, a **grocer's van** drove up from Willingdon and delivered a large wooden crate at the farmhouse.

In example (24), the relation between the PR and PM name a type of a *van*, not an instance, that is, they invoke one kind of entity with respect to which the target type is identified; *a grocer* as the initial nominal, designates the type. The possibility exists that in (24), the relation between *grocer* and *van* can be assimilated to the prototype PC, and thus the example is viewed as an instance of non-prototypical possession. This instance is understood in terms of possession relation in virtue of such aspects as having specific PRs, who are human beings and have exclusive rights of access to a *van*, this right probably is a long-term one till the time the PR stops working as a grocer. A *van* is meant for anyone who should happen to be a grocer. *Van* as the PM, is a specific concrete thing and is also an object of value to those grocers who use it for their daily works. Moreover, the notion of proximity is also at issue; the *van* is in a close proximity of its grocer drivers.

The second type of uncategorized instances is of measurement possessives. Consider the following example of this type that is taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.76):

- (25) In the middle of the summer Moses the raven suddenly reappeared on the farm, after **an absence of several years**.

In example (25), the relation between the two entities *an absence* and *several years* is of measurement. The PM *an absence* designates a noun to which the notion of property of measure stands for. It is a basic PC that gives rise to the structuralization of the concepts conveying a relation between a noun and a measurable property. The notions of exclusivity and relatedness between PR-PM provides the conceptual link between the concept of measure of *an absence* and the possession relation, in that *several years* as a measurable property is conceptualized exclusively in relation to a designated noun *an absence* not other nouns. However, the requirement that a PR be human has been lifted; inanimate abstract notion, like *several years* can also be talked about to have anything related to it.

The third type of uncategorized PCs is of temporal or time possessives. The example of this type is illustrated below which is taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.19):

- (26) Here **the work of the coming week** was planned out and resolutions were put forward and debated.

In example (26), the relation between *the work* and *the coming week* is a relation of a time and an activity which persists in that time. This example identifies *the work* with reference to a time *the coming week*. This relation between the activity *work* and the time *the coming week* comes close to the relation of strict possession in virtue of having some aspects of similarity. The shared meaning is the “sense of relatedness”. In (26), *the work* is any specific work that has to be done in *the coming week* only, not any other time. Exclusivity is also at issue, because the work done is exclusive to *the coming week*; *the work* is due for the coming week only. It also involves proximity; *the work* is necessarily maximally close to the time in which it has to be persisted.

The fourth type of uncategorized PCs is of subject matter possessives. An example of this type is illustrated below that is taken from Orwell (1945/2013, p.61):

- (27)on the wall of the big barn, at the opposite end from the Seven Commandments. It was surmounted by **a portrait of Napoleon**, in profile, executed by Squealer in white paint.

Example (27) can be considered as multi-membership possessive, but as it is used in a specific context of use, a concept of a representational noun *portrait* is identified that represents in some medium, another entity, which is *Napoleon*, rather than the creator of the artifact. This example conforms to basic PC. One can come up with the idea that the shared meaning between the two concepts is of relatedness and exclusiveness, and this exclusivity of the PR-PM relation is the aspect of the possession prototype that carries over into notions of subject matter possessives, thus enabling the construction to fulfill its referential function of guaranteeing the unique identification of the target entity. A *portrait* as a representational noun,

represents only one specific figure, who is *Napoleon*, not any other figures. The *portrait* is exclusive to *Napoleon* only since the portrait is a medium dedicated to represent *Napoleon*. The relation between the representational noun *portrait* and the represented object *Napoleon* is probably a long-term one, because the *portrait* displays *Napoleon* as long as the portrait exists. Furthermore, the requirement that a PR be a human being is also at issue; *Napoleon* is the name of the person shown in a *portrait*.

It is worth mentioning that, the different semantic relations of all four uncategorized examples are regarded as extremely marginal examples of basic PCs, which have led to the idea that there must be some relation of association between the PR and the PM, and this relation is of “relatedness”. The basic PCs are experientially grounded conceptual archetypes, and aspects of this experiential gestalt, which is highly concrete, motivate the structuralization of other concepts, which are so abstract and complex, via the same structures of basic possessives. This is where grammar is conceptualized. Expressing the concepts of description, measurement, time, and subject matter possessives are so abstract to the degree that when speakers express them, grammar cannot reflect them that is why in this case there is a more systematic and natural way of reflecting the concepts.

In the sense of Lakoff (1977) who verify the above explanations, saying that aspects of the experiential gestalt motivate the wider use of the possessive construction, namely as a means for uniquely identifying the referent of the construction’s head noun. The conceptual archetype, which is a meaning of possession relation expressed by typical PC, is so essential to cognition, so there occur cognitive forces to make a link between concepts that share nearly the same semantic relations between the entities.

To establish that the possession relation does indeed have a privileged status in the semantics of these uncategorized constructions, Brown’s observations (1973) in the acquisition literature suggest that the child’s earliest possessive expressions denote predominantly relations which are very close to the possession gestalt (p.233). The researchers note that more abstract and complex concepts of (24-27) do not occur in early speech at all, but children have primitive local notions of property and

territoriality which they express with the possessives, and then through passing time, typical PC motivates the structuralization of these complex concepts. This is where grammar is going through a conceptualization process.

6. Summary and Findings

Through the theoretical background sections and the other sections of the practical analysis of the novel, the paper arrives at the following findings:

1. Event schemas, often referred to as scripts and are defined as high-level schematically organized knowledge structures. There are certain complex or less concrete concepts for which there is no grammatical structure, their conceptualization are traced back to a small set of basic conceptual patterns. Using grammaticalization theory Heine (1997a,1997b) describes how each affects the word order and morphosyntax of the resulting PC.
2. Even though inalienable PCs may differ from locative, companion and existential constructions syntactically or semantically, they refer back to these schemas in nature because of the conceptual affinity.
3. The term “existential sentence” is used to refer to a specialized or non-canonical construction which expresses a proposition about the existence or the presence of someone or something. Because of their special structural and interpretive characteristics, existential sentences offers a rich ground on which to concern the semantics of inalienable possessive phrases, as well as showing the role of non-canonical constructions in information packaging.
4. There are certain cases which Heine himself could not subsume under any of the heading of categories of inalienable possessions; he calls them OTHER, apart from those uncategorized PCs to which he even could not account for. No possessive structure comes out arbitrarily; every single meaning of linguistic structures to satisfy communicative needs have a natural semantic source that help shape the structure.
5. The first reason for why only structures, such as Location, Accompaniment, and existential are employed for PCs is because such structures frequently involve copula-like items as predicates, and such items typically exhibit reduced verbal

behavior, which is quite compatible with notions of “possession” and “relatedness”. Second, one may invoke the effects of grammaticalization.

6. The co-occurrence of possession gestalt properties constitutes instances of prototypical, or paradigmatic, possession. The range of different semantic relations of possessives are structuralized through the concrete structure of prototypical PC only, because there occur some aspects of conceptual affinity of “relatedness” and “exclusiveness” between the concrete concept of strict relational possession, which is rooted from experience, and the other complex semantic relations, which are rooted in some aspects of the possession gestalt.
7. Figure 5 below shows the total percentage frequency for each type of PCs in Orwell’s “Animal Farm” according to Heine’s classification of different semantic relations. It is clear from the Figure that the largest proportion is the concept of “inherent parts of other items”, and “kinship”, “description”, and “measurement” possessives comprise the smallest proportions. This is the case because the concept of “inherent parts of other items” is so abstract to an extent that a grammatical set of formal rules cannot conceptualize it. In this case, speakers make a conceptual link between the experiential elements of the complex concept and the other already conventionalized concrete and simple concepts, which serve as conceptual templates, to conceptualize and structuralize the complex concept. Basically, this results at the fact that concrete and simple concepts are easily abstracted from language use because people can experience them at least by one of their five sensations while interacting with other people.




Figure (5): The total number of frequency by percentage for the subcategories of PCs in “Animal Farm”

7. Conclusions

The grammar of a language is not just a long list of formal rules; a grammar is seen as a cognitive achievement. Speakers have found to structure their thoughts with the intention to communicate them. The grammatical structures of inalienable PCs reflect the physical and social experiences of its speakers. Event schemas, as cognitive structures, are generalized knowledge of what happens at common real life events. They are important cognitive tools for social understanding that is why grammatical patterns have an experiential basis in concrete; the “observable strings of words” in alienable possessives do not exist in the abstract, they are always part of the conventionalized cognitive structures, like Location, Accompaniment, and existential Schemas, that are abstracted from language use since birth.

Once people know the encyclopedic knowledge of both the PR and PM in a particular inalienable possessive phrase, they know why the phrase is structured the way it is.

Another concluding point is that the strict possession relation does indeed have a privileged status in the semantics of other complex concepts. Whenever a relation of paradigmatic possession exists between two entities, the relation is expressed in a possessive genitive expression because the experiential gestalt is complex in the sense that a large number of aspects are involved, in virtue of some kind of similarity with at least one of the properties of the prototype PC.

Most of what were traditionally regarded as arbitrary and irregular uses of various possessive semantic relations can be explained using cognitive analysis. Non-cognitivists put semantics out of their focus. Keeping semantics as a primary focus for analyzing PCs, leads linguists to know why PCs are structured the way they are.

Last but not the least, All the PCs extracted from Orwell’s “Animal Farm” cannot be accounted for by following only one model; Heine’s model is inadequate and fails to account for all the semantic relations expressed through PC. There has to be other models to capture the cognitive analysis fully.

7.1 Suggestions for Further Research

Having investigated this paper, the researchers have found out that there are some other topics stretching out from the paper, which are suggested for further investigations:

1. A cognitive grammatical study of possessive constructions at verbal level in some other modern novels.
2. A cognitive grammatical analysis of idiomatic possessive constructions in real life situations.
3. A cognitive grammatical study of transitive verbs in some of Orwell’s literary works.
4. A cognitive grammatical study of metonymy in real life dialogue.



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تویژینه وهیه کی ریزمانی هۆشه کی پیکهاته خاوه ندریه تیه لیکجیانه کراوه کان له "کیلگه ی نازه لان" ی ئورویل

پوخته

ئهم تویژینه وهیه تیشک دهخاته سهر لیکۆلینه وهی دهربرینه خاوه ندریه تیه لیکجیانه کراوه کان وهک به شیک له ئەزموونی مروۆقی له جیهاندا، له ژیر چوارچیوهی ریزمانی هۆشه کی به به کارهینانی نموونه ریگی "هاین" (1997، 1997ب). لای دهستوره کۆنه کان و ریزمانزانان، پیکهاته و مانای دهربرینه خاوه ندریه تیه کان به پیی کۆمه لیک یاسای فهرمی ریزمانی پیناسه دهکریت و پیکهاته خه زنگراوه هۆشه کییه کان فهرامۆش دهکرین. له زمانی ئینگلیزیدا، چهنده ها حالت هه ن که تیایدا پیکهاته خاوه ندریه تیه کان وینای زنجیره یه ک له په یوهندی مانای جیاواز دهکهن به شیوه یه ک ناوانی هه موویان له ژیر ناو نیشانی "هه بوون" کاریکی زۆر نامۆ و نابه جیه. ئهم لیکۆلینه وهیه ئامانج دهخاته سهر روونکردنه وهی تیگه یشتنیک که ئاماژه به وه دهکات پیکهاته ی خاوه ندریه تیه کان پیک به ستراو دهبن به پیی مانای گونجای پیکهاته بچو کتره کان له گه ل یه کتری له ناو پیکهاته خاوه ندریه تیه که دا. وههروه ها ئهم لیکۆلینه وهیه تیشک دهخاته سهر روونکردنه وهی ئه وهی که پیکهاته ی ریزمانی خاوه ندریه تیه لیکجیانه کراوه کان به ئاسانی پیشینی دهکریت کاتیک خه لک زنجیره یه ک له پیکهاته

خه زنگراوه هۆشه كيه كانيان زانى. وهه روهها ئامانجىكى ديكهى ئەم لىكۆلینه وهیه ئەوهیه كه مانای چه مكى خاوه ندریه تی له بنچینهی مانای چه مكه كانی ديكه دا بوونی ههیه. ئەم لىكۆلینه وهیه گریمانه ی ئەوه دهكات كه مانای ههردوو چه مكى پىكهاته ی خاوه ندر و سامان له یهك گریی خاوه ندریه تیدا له گه ل یه كتریدا دهگونجین. وهه روهها گریمانه ی ئەوه كراوه كه پزیمان ناتوانیت هه میشه وینای هه موو ئەو چه مكانه بكات ك له میشكى قسه كه ریكدا بوونی ههیه، له زماندا چه ندهها چه مكى نابهرجهسته كراوهیه كه پزیمان ناتوانیت وینایان بكات؛ ئەم چه مكانه ش به گشتی له لایه ن پىكهاته ی چه ند چه مكى به رجاسته كراوه وه وینایان بو ده كریت، ئەوانیش سیستمه كانی مانا و پىكهاته ی خاوه ندریه تی نمونه ییبه كه له گه لیاندا لىكچونىك له مانادا ههیه. ئەم توپزینه وهیه ده گاته ئەو ئەنجامه ی كه پىكهاته ی پزیمانی ئەم ژماره زۆره ی هه ره مكه ی پىكهاته خاوه ندریه تیه كان بنیات دهنریت له سه ر بنچینه ی پىكه وه گونجاوی مانای ههردوو یه كه ی خاوه ندر و سامان، سه ره رای ئەوه ی كه بنیات دهنرین له سه ر توانای پرۆسه ی گواستنه وه ی مانای چه مكه به رجسته كراوه كان بو ئەو چه مكانه ی كه كه متر به رجسته كراون.

تحليل النحوية إدراكية للتراكيب التملك غير القابلة للتصرف في رواية "مزرعة

الحيوانات"

ملخص

يركز البحث الحالي على دراسة التراكيب التملك غير القابلة للتصرف كجزء من التجارب الإنسانية في العالم وذلك في إطار القواعد المعرفية باستخدام نموذج "هاين" (1997، 1997 ب). الدساتير القديمة (التقليدية) للغة تعاملوا مع بنية ومعنى التراكيب التملك باستخدام النظام حكم الرسمي وتهملوا التراكيب المعرفية المخزونة. في اللغة الإنكليزية، التراكيب التملك موضحة على حزمة من المعاني المختلفة المترابطة التي تشير إلى كل هذه المعاني تحت العنوان "التملك" ستكون مظلمة. البحث يهدف إلى شرح فرضية بأن مكونات التعابير التملك مرتبطة بسلاسل التكاملية. و أيضاً يركز البحث على توضيح التراكيب القواعدية للتملك بأنها تبينة في حال اذا كان الشخص لديه علم بهيكل المعرفي المخزوني. والهدف الآخر هو أن التملك لديها أهمية خاصة في القواعد المفاهيم المختلفة الأخرى. واحدة من الفرضيات هي بأن اثنين من أجزاء التراكيب المختلفة من التملك هو مركب وتعتمد على التراكيب المفهومي لكل الجزئين. الفرضية أخرى هي بأن هنالك مفاهيم معقدة و مجردة في ذهن المتكلم بحيث أن القواعد لا يمكن أن تفسره. وهذه المفاهيم المعقدة هي مرتبطة بواسطة تراكيب بعض المفاهيم المتناسية وهي مخططات الأحداث وملكية التجريبية. البحث يستنتج بأن التراكيب القواعدية للملكات العشوائية المتكرره هي مبنية على العلاقة المفاهيم بين المالك و الممتلكات، وقابلية في طرح مشروع المفاهيم الجامدة إلى مفاهيم أقل جامدية و أقل تماسكا.