

Institution-Building as State-Building in Weak States Iraq as a Case Study

Zubir R. Ahmed,

International Relations and Diplomacy, College of Political Science, University of Salahaddin, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq.

Email: zubir.ahmed@su.edu.krd

Handren Ahmad Eahya

Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Law and International Relations, Erbil, Kurdistan Region, Iraq.

Email: handren.eahya@soran.edu.iq

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to discuss and analyses the theoretical understanding of institution-building as state-building. It examines Fukuyama's conceptual understanding of institutions and applies it in the context of state-building in Iraq. The significance of the subject is that it is one of the most controversial topics in contemporary politics and international relations. A political analysis method was used and the research data dealt with by examining a number of variables. It will argue that the process of state-building in Iraq since 2003 has been complex and challenging, marked by a series of successes, setbacks, and ongoing struggles. Furthermore, Iraq's post-Saddam era has been marked by efforts to build and strengthen various state institutions. These institutions include the judiciary, security forces, and other government bodies responsible for essential functions such as education, healthcare, infrastructure, and finance. However, the process of institution-building in Iraq has faced significant challenges, which include ethno-sectarian divisions, insurgencies, and external influences that have complicated the political landscape and hindered efforts to create stable institutions. Corruption and inefficiency have also been persistent issues that have hindered the development of a strong governing framework. This study

concludes that Iraqi political institutions are deeply fragmented.

Introduction

Following the attacks on 11 September 2001, the US White House argued that the primary threat to the United States was not from conquering states, but rather from weak or failed states and so the invasion of Iraq was built on a premise of state-building. In a book on nation-state building, one of its advocates, James Dobbins, offers a good definition of it as “Nation Building (State-building) as a use of armed forces in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin a transition to democracy” (Dobbins, 2006, p. 218). This definition exists in the US military. If we look at the US military, it is clear that its counterinsurgency measures contain key elements of state-building, and political reform and economic development are seen as tactics or strategies towards fighting insurgents (State, U.S. Department of, 2009, pp. 2-4). This raises the question of whether state-building by the US is a post-Cold War phenomenon or is it something we have only seen since 11 September 2001? Observers believe that US nation-state building goes back much further. There is agreement that there are about eighteen cases of attempted US nation-state building dating from the period of Reconstruction (1866-1877) in the American South. When we look at this list, the measurement is democracy after ten years. What is obviously striking is that out of those eighteen cases, the US only has four cases of successful nation-state building. Most of the debates focus around what are deemed to be successes in West Germany and Japan (Moore, 2009). This opens up another question of what explains this variation and why so many apparent failures and so few successes? Dobbins and Fukuyama argue that successful nation-state building by the US depends primarily on political will and the arranging of resources. They believe that the greater the political will, the better the chance for success (Dobbins, et al., 2003), (Fukuyama, 2004). On the other hand, critics such as Jason Brownlee have written that in world politics it can be argued that it is not a matter of will or political resources; rather, the US does best when it

does less and this is the important variable for explaining success in Japan and West Germany. The failures in most other places lie with the antecedent conditions regarding the political institutions and the economy. Germany and Japan can be explained, not by American will or the amount of money spent, but by the simple fact that Japan and Germany already had an established robust domestic economy, a history of parliament, and a shared national identity (Brownlee, 2007).

There is a debate regarding US state-building in the developing world, particularly around the lessons that can be drawn from Iraq. Here it is important to understand what officials in Washington thought they were going to get in post-invasion Iraq. They believed that they were going to get liberal institutional order with transparent rules and the basis of a productive liberal environment. Instead, today we look back on Iraq as an estimated two Trillion of dollars in capital have left the country (Crawford, 2020) and at least two million people are externally displaced; these displaced people belonged to the private sector and the middle and professional classes on which any society relies for economic development. There have been millions of barrels of oil smuggled since 2003 and the latest World Bank estimates are that about thirty per cent of young males in Iraq are unemployed. The argument developed in this research is essentially that the Iraqi political institutions are deeply fragmented (Moore, 2009).

The rationale behind the research can be justified for numerous reasons. First, it is the desire of the Iraqi people to establish an independent liberal political system in a region where authoritarianism and dictatorship are models for political systems. Second, the study is significant because of the ongoing ethno-sectarian conflict in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. In terms of its methodology, this study will draw on the existing literature on institution-building in other countries to explain the building of strong institutions in Iraq. Therefore, the research will use a conceptual approach. The methodological approach used in this research is a qualitative argument, drawing on indications from policy literature, scholarly non-governmental reports, and government databases.

The method employed in the methodological approach used in this study is a qualitative one. The approach is indicated by the policy literature and scholarly, non-governmental reports and governmental databases.

Thus, the main purpose of this research is to answer the following question: “Why is the USA, in a state-building intervention, unable to build strong institutions in post-2003 Iraq?” The objective of the study is met as follows. First, it starts with an overview of state-building. Then, the theoretical understanding of state-building in terms of political system design, the basis of legitimization, cultural and structural factors, and organizational design and management in post-conflict societies will be clarified. Second, in order to understand the strategic rationale behind state-building and peace-building, the theory of institutional formation as state-building will follow. Third, post-2003 Iraq will be discussed as a case study as an important part of the process of the institutions of state-building. Then, the institution-making process is discussed by explaining the scope of institutions, which is divided into three main functions taking examples from different sectors in the country. This study also discusses the strength of the Iraqi state. The factors of corruption, transparency, legitimacy, and international support are each argued as the main principles of the strength of Iraqi institutions.

Literature Review: State-building as institution-building

The theory of state-building is understood by many scholars to relate to the creation of formal government institutions and to strengthening the existing ones in post-conflict countries. The term institution-building is one of the most important concepts in the state-building process. There are many scholars who have defined the concept of institution-building within state-building. Zaum, for example, defines state-building as a process of establishing government institutions in a post-conflict society by the international community (Zaum, 2007, p. 1).

Fukuyama has tried to explain the importance of state government institutions in detail. Fukuyama focuses on the reduction of the scope of a government’s institutions instead of strengthening it. This is because economic development requires limits on the ‘scope’ of the state and important ‘strength’ of the state. He

also argues that all of the great struggles of the 20th century concerned the scope of the state, which was considered an assumption of the beginning of state-building (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 19).

Here, it is important to explain and make a distinction between scope and strength: the scope of a state depends on the number of functions that it is trying to achieve. The first are minimal functions, such as law and order, public health, and macroeconomic managing. The second are intermediate functions, such as anti-trust regulations, protection of the environment, and education. Finally, there are activist functions, such as industrial policy and wealth redistribution. States can be planned according to activist functions in order to achieve better scope. Western countries have tried, through the Washington Consensus, to intervene in most post-conflict societies, especially when neoliberalism was dominant, in order to decrease the scope of the governments. However, their efforts were not successful. This is because the Washington Consensus as a part of US state-building policy, decreased the scope of the state but did not increase its strength (Fukuyama, 2004, pp. 7-9).

The strength of the state, its institutional capacity, is not like its scope; it is measured by the effectiveness of the state. In other words, it is the capacity of the government institutions to create and impose laws, control government corruption, and stay accountable. Strength can be planned by using numerous administrators, such as Transparency International, the World Bank, and the Freedom House index of civil and political liberties (Garzarelli & Thomassen, 2006, pp. 2-3).

In order to understand institutional capacity, it is important to explain which institutions are more important than others, how these institutions must be designed and how they are related to development outcomes. It can be stated that the design of government institutions has a positive impact on the definition of the state, and whether it is weak or strong. This is because institutions such as the parliament and government should act as institutions and not be affected by the intervention of parties or any other groups within the state. Rather, the institutions themselves are the proximate causes of development, and can be shown to be exogenous in several cases to the material circumstances under which a particular society grows (Fukuyama, 2007, pp. 21-25). As outlined below, Fukuyama proposes

four main mechanisms regarding building strong institutions (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 23).

First, the **design of the political system** is one of the main aspects of statehood that must be taken into consideration. There are a lot of studies explaining the importance of political system design in order to build a strong state in post-conflict countries. There is no specific agreement on which political system design - a parliamentary or a presidential system - is the best (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 24). The most stable political system is the one that can survive in a time of crisis without internal warfare (Heslop, 2019). As Fukuyama argues, building a state is not just about the political system design; rather, it is about the way of governing the state. For instance, Nigeria had taken income from oil of about \$400 to nearly \$500 billion in the previous 30 years. Although the country was applying a stable political system, the per capita income was still decreasing in the country and the poverty rate was about 70%. Bad governance and corruption in Nigeria were the main causes of having a large amount of poverty in the country (Fukuyama, 2013, p. 2).

Second, another aspect of statehood is related to the **basis of legitimization**. Here, state institutions could not achieve the state's goals by only working together and ignoring the legitimacy which is crucial for society. In other words, institutions of states without legitimacy can rarely achieve their goal of building a strong state. This is because the people should feel that the state is theirs and can protect the people's interests (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 26). However, legitimacy varies from one society to another. As Dagher (2018) argues in her paper 'Legitimacy and post-conflict state-building', legitimacy is the most important aspect of building states in post-conflict societies. She adds that the most-often-proposed way to achieve legitimacy is the one from Western democracies. As referred to earlier, she focuses on four main sources of legitimacy in post-conflict societies: shared beliefs, process legitimacy, international legitimacy, and performance legitimacy (Dagher, 2018, p. 88).

Third, **cultural and structural factors** linked to norms, values, and culture affect the institutional capacity. Foreigners must pay attention to cultural and structural factors because not all cultures accept all forms of institutions (Fukuyama, 2004, p.

27). Indeed, it is not suitable or practically implementable to apply Western institutions, which are compatible with their own cultures, to Asian or African countries. For example, during the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 in some Arab countries, Western states tried to implement a democratic system in those countries, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, but did not succeed. This is because the nature of Arab countries in terms of their norms, values, and culture is different from that in Western countries. That is why Arab countries need a system that is appropriate to their culture or norms (Brown, 2013, pp. 51-56).

The last level, that of **organizational design and management**, is related to business schools, especially when applied to the public administration and private sectors (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 23). Here, organizational design and management is the field in which the government serves the country in order to achieve the common good and affect positive change. These organizational design and management are prepared to manage all levels of government: the local, state, and federal levels. Thus, organizational design and management refers to good structure and design that helps to improve connectivity, increase productivity, and promote creativity in the country (MPA & UNC, 2023).

The scope of Iraqi institutions

The scope of Iraqi institutions can refer to the range and extent of their responsibilities, authorities, and activities within the country. In order to understand the scope of Iraqi institutions, they can be divided in terms of three different functions. This sub-section explains the scope of Iraqi institutions according to Francis Fukuyama's framework, which is presented in the above section in this research (Fukuyama, 2004, pp. 7-9). This approach will assist in understanding the ability of Iraqi institutions in terms of rebuilding the state since 2003.

First, the minimal function of Iraqi institutions: security institutions are responsible for maintaining law and order, safeguarding national security, and protecting citizens. They include the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, and various security forces, such as the Iraqi Army, Police, and National Intelligence Service. After the US invasion of Iraq, there was a lack of security and this affected the law

and order in the country. This is because when a system is changed, this usually only happens for a short time. Since that time, there have been a number of conflicts inside the country, with even terrorist organizations such as ISIS occupying much of the territory. As political scientist Anders Persson states that one of the crucial dimensions of state-building is security, especially in a post-conflict country, in order to impose law and order (Persson, 2011, p. 7).

Furthermore, macroeconomic management in Iraq should involve the formulation and implementation of policies to achieve stable and sustainable economic growth, control inflation, manage fiscal policies, ensure exchange rate stability, and promote overall economic stability. The Iraqi government formulates fiscal policies to manage government revenue and expenditures. This includes budget planning, taxation policies, public expenditure management, and debt management. The aim is to maintain fiscal discipline, promote sustainable public finances, and allocate resources efficiently. However, according to research involving an analysis of macroeconomic gaps in Iraq, investment remains weak in the public sector. There is also the erosion of infrastructure in security-stable governorates and its destruction in unstable governorates (Rasheed, 2020, p. 1261).

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) is responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy. Its primary objective is to maintain price stability and control inflation. The CBI uses various tools, such as setting interest rates, managing money supply, and regulating the banking sector to achieve its objectives. Iraq's exchange rate policy is managed by the CBI. The Iraqi dinar (IQD) is the national currency, and the CBI plays a role in maintaining its stability. The exchange rate regime and policies can influence trade competitiveness, inflation, and the overall economic environment (Central Bank of Iraq, 2023).

However, the CBI has not been able to stabilize the exchange rate of the IQD because Iraq has experienced relatively high inflation rates in recent years. When inflation is high, it can erode the value of currency and undermine efforts to stabilize its exchange rate. Controlling inflation requires appropriate monetary policies, which can be challenging to implement effectively. The CBI has limited tools at its disposal to control the exchange rate because it lacks independence and operates

under a traditional banking system. According to the Iraqi Economists Network, dollar smuggling operations from Iraq to Iran and Turkey and even extend beyond the Middle East to include countries such as Russia, and North Korea. The smugglers have obtained about \$100 million a month by exploiting the CBI's selling system (Iraqi Economists Network, 2023).

Second, intermediate function is another important basis of the scope of Iraqi institutions. The education system in Iraq is an important component of the country's institutional framework. It encompasses various institutions and organizations that provide formal education at different levels. The Iraqi education system plays an important role in institution-building within the country (Nuffic, 2015, p. 6). There are different ways in which the education system could have an impact on institution-building in Iraq.

A strong education system helps develop a skilled and knowledgeable workforce. By providing good-quality education and training to individuals, the education system contributes to building a pool of qualified professionals, administrators, and leaders who can serve effectively in various institutions. Nevertheless, the education system in Iraq has been meaningfully disrupted over the last decade because of displacement and ongoing conflicts. In terms of learning levels, the country is among the weakest in the Middle East and lack of education is consistently the top protection risk for the Iraqi generation and affects the development of the country (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2022).

Third, the activist function of Iraq refers to all the high-level activities undertaken by the government, such as wealth distribution and industrial policy. Wealth distribution plays an important role in the process of institution-building in Iraq. Iraq is a country with significant natural resources, particularly oil, which has the potential to generate substantial wealth for the nation. However, the unequal distribution of wealth can create various challenges and have significant implications for state-building efforts. The oil wealth became bad for growth and bad for democracy, since it tended to hinder the development of state institutions (Bridsall & Subramanian, 2004, p. 77).

The industrial policy in Iraq is generally characterized as the involvement of selective governments to promote a particular economic field and to facilitate structural change that would address sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, and services. According to the research, the Iraqi state needs to develop a strategy for the development of its industries according to the following axes: 1) building a centre for competitive industrial groups based on large industrial facilities integrated with local and global value chains; 2) creating effective and stable working conditions that would allow the existence and growth of private companies; 3) improving the industrial and knowledge infrastructure; and 4) adopting an appropriate governance system that would support the implementation of the above points (Hayaly, 2021, p. 151). However, there is no long-term plan for the industrial sector. This means that there are no national projects in the country to build a state in the long term (Mahdi, et al., 2014, pp. 6-7).

The strength of the Iraq state

The assessment of Iraq as a strong state, or not, can be demonstrated in many ways. This study emphasizes corruption, transparency, having a well-organized society, legitimacy, and international support for the Iraqi state in determining the strength of the state of Iraq.

Corruption

Corruption is an action or gain that falls outside the scope of legal institutional procedures (Cordesman, 2023, p. 25). What is clear is that the rates of poverty in many countries are rooted in corruption. One result of this corruption is that it builds a weak or failed state. Iraq, as with many other countries, is not safe from corruption in its institutions. Transparency International stated in 2022 that Iraq was one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Iraq was placed 157 out of 180 countries for corruption in 2022 (Trading Economics, 2022).

The principal reason for the presence of corruption in Iraq is that the main ministries are staffed on the basis of political ties rather than competency. This has caused reconstruction projects to become increasingly mismanaged and then handed to the

government. Since 2003, the Iraqi public sector has become an instrument, with a rise in the number of elites manipulating civil servant positions for their party loyalists. Thus, the Iraqi public sector was ranked as the 23rd most corrupt such body in the world in 2022 (Dhingra & Alshamary, 2023).

Cordesman (2023) has pointed out that the existence of such a high level of corruption will negatively affect the state of Iraq and may cause it to collapse. In the future, it will undermine human potential and justice, bringing it down to a low level, and will then destroy trust between the government and its people. If the corruption situation continues long term, it will bring political upheaval and economic crises in the country, and will have a very negative impact on Iraq becoming a strong state (Cordesman, 2023, pp. 25-27).

Transparency

In order to understand what transparency is, it is important to define it. Transparency is broadly known as one of the main principles of good governance. Transparency means contributing information and performing by open means. Free access to data is an important element in supporting transparency. In other words, transparency in the governance sense means being open and truthful in all official activities and that governments should act openly on the assumption that all operations are sufficiently scrupulous to withstand public inspection (Making the Forest Sector Transparent, 2023).

Iraq is one of the largest oil-producing countries in the world. The oil sector contributes significantly to the country's economy. However, the lack of transparency in the oil industry has been a major concern for many years. Transparency in the oil industry is essential to ensure that the revenue generated from oil sales is used for the betterment of the country and its people. Thus, the lack of transparency in the oil and economic system has led to the mismanagement of resources and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few (Dhingra & Alshamary, 2023).

Political transparency is another critical aspect of transparency in Iraq. The lack of transparency in the political system has led to corruption, nepotism, and favoritism.

Transparency in a political system is essential to ensure that the government is accountable to the people and that the decisions made by the government are in the best interests of the country and its people (OECD Benchmark report, 2023, p. 6). Thus, there are several challenges to transparency in Iraq. Corruption, lack of accountability, and political instability are some of the main challenges. Overcoming these challenges will require a concerted effort from the government, civil society, and the international community. It also requires a change in mindset and a commitment to transparency and accountability.

The existence of trust between the government and its citizens is considered one of the most important factors in the strength of a state. In contrast, the lack of that trust will have a negative impact on the country and lead to instability and insecurity. In Iraq, there is a lack of trust, which means that Iraqis do not have confidence in society and so doubt that the state will be able to help them achieve their dreams and goals. Economic crises, no electricity, lack of clean water in the southern provinces, and poverty became a part of daily life for the Iraqi people. This situation led to the Iraqi people not having trust in their government (Alhassan, 2021).

A well-organized society

The concept of a well-organized society has been viewed by Fukuyama as another important subject in terms of state-building. The concept of a well-organized society can also be called the way of life of a society (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 82). This means that the organization of society is considered a way of life which is reflected in all individuals in a society. A well-organized society requires peace and security, as well as predictability. Indeed, a well-organized society is one of the basic indications of the strength of the state. It means that if the state institutions and society are organized and work well, this has an active effect on building a strong state. Hence, well-functioning institutions and civic organizations are essential for thriving states and are a solution to a failed state's problems.

Most of the social institutions and civic organizations in Iraq are not organized and do not work actively because of the lack of institutionalization. However, in 2003,

when the US invaded, Iraq tried to reorganize the country and make it a well-organized society. This became especially difficult after changing the political system from a dictatorship to a democracy without paying attention to the social values and norms of Iraqi society. This is because the US believed that the country could have a well-organized society by applying democratic principles to Iraqi society (Stanski, 2005, p. 197). However, this approach did not succeed because Iraq has a population that, throughout history, has been known to be a religious people, and to prioritize religion above other, human-invented principles. Iraqi society has its own values and norms which are based on those of Islamic societies (Alshamary, 2022, p. 23).

The legitimacy of the Iraqi state

The concept of legitimacy has been used by Fukuyama as another important subject area in terms of state-building. According to Fukuyama, a successful state needs political legitimacy, which involves the recognition and acceptance of the state's authority by its citizens. This legitimacy can be derived from a democratic process, participatory governance, or other forms of social consensus. The issue of legitimacy has played a crucial role in the process of state-building in Iraq (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 26).

Since the topple of Saddam Husain's regime in 2003, Iraq has faced many challenges in establishing a legitimate state structure. The following are some of the ways in which legitimacy has influenced the state-building process in Iraq. First, the 2003 US-led invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq faced international criticism, raising questions about the legitimacy of the entire process. The absence of a clear UN mandate and the widespread opposition to the invasion undermined the legitimacy of the new political order from the outset. This is because using military operations is legally and morally questionable, and the occupation of Iraq by the USA and the UK and their efforts to impose a shadow government in Iraq is not liberation (Rafique, 2003, p. 30).

Second, the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as the transitional government in Iraq further complicated the legitimacy issue, as the CPA,

led by the USA, was viewed by many Iraqis as an occupying force rather than a legitimate authority representing their interests. This led to a growing sense of resentment and opposition to the new government, which further complicated the process of state-building in the country (Diamond, 2004, pp. 34-35).

Third, Iraq's ethno-sectarian divisions and conflicts, primarily between the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations, have posed a significant challenge to state-building and legitimacy. Following the invasion, the majority of the Shia population, previously marginalized by Saddam Hussain's Sunni-led regime, sought to assert their political power. This led to a power vacuum and intensified sectarian tensions, undermining the legitimacy of the state-building process. In addition, the rise of ethno-sectarian violence, particularly between Sunni and Shia militias, eroded the legitimacy of the state-building efforts still further. The inability of the Iraqi government to provide security and protect its citizens created an atmosphere of chaos and undermined faith in the state's ability to maintain order and stability (Eriksson & Grief, 2023, p. 366).

Fourth, Iraq has held several national elections since 2005. These elections aimed to establish a representative government and enhance the legitimacy of the state-building process. However, electoral processes in Iraq have been marred by accusations of fraud and a lack of broad-based participation, further challenging the legitimacy of the political system (Iraqi Thoughts, 2018).

Fifth, building effective state institutions and improving governance have been crucial for establishing legitimacy in Iraq. Corruption, nepotism, and the lack of capable and accountable institutions have hindered progress. The weakness of the state institutions, including the police, judiciary, and bureaucracy, has diminished the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi population (Cordesman, 2023, pp. 25-27).

Finally, the emergence of ISIS in 2014 dealt a severe blow to the legitimacy of the Iraqi state. The inability of the Iraqi security forces to counter the rapid advance of ISIS highlighted the weaknesses of the state and further eroded trust in the government's ability to provide security and protect its citizens. As Eriksson and Grief (2023) state, both ISIS and the Tishreen Movement are two examples that

reflect the nature of the grievances against the Iraqi state and the role of identity in shaping their alternative visions. Thus, it can be argued that identity is key to understanding the supposed legitimacy failures of the state (Eriksson & Grief, 2023, p. 363).

Addressing the issue of legitimacy is important for the long-term stability and success of state-building in Iraq. It requires effort to build inclusive political institutions, promote national reconciliation, ensure the rule of law, combat corruption, and address the underlying ethno-sectarian conflicts in Iraq. Thus, achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi population is important for establishing a strong and sustainable state structure.

Conclusion

The international community has struggled to build a strong country for those states that are weak or have failed. This is because those countries which are affected have problems that are international, such as terror campaigns, IDIS, immigration, and so on. That is why the international community, especially the USA, has helped build most of the post-conflict countries, starting from Germany after WWII and continuing now with Iraq. The USA decided to change the political system of Iraq from a totalitarian regime to one with a democratic basis in 2003 as a part of a US strategy to build a strong country in Iraq. Although the USA was successful in building strong states in Germany and Japan, the American nation-state building did not succeed in most of the other countries subsequently. What I found here is that the countries like Germany and Japan already have been experienced with having a history of parliament, developing economy, and a shared identity. But a country like Iraq has not experiences with that especially Iraq was struggling of having a shared identity like Iraqi identity.

This study has presented the theoretical understanding of the concept of the state and outlined the different definitions of state-building in post-conflict countries. The research has also tried to choose definitions of the state and state-building in terms of the way they are used in the most widely recognized of the scholars' works. Modern political thought, such as that outlined by Francis Fukuyama in his book

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, has focused especially on the concept of state-building in weak or failed states because those countries are considered a source of the world's most serious problems, such as unrest, terrorism, and immigration issues. However, this concept does not mean the creation of a new state; rather, it is an attempt to reorganize and activate a state's institutions. State-building can also mean building new institutions and strengthening the existing ones (Fukuyama, 2004, p. IX).

In addition, states need to determine their scope and strength, whereby scope is considered the range of activities undertaken and strength is referred to in the sense of effectiveness. Here, states are required to limit their scope and increase their institutional strength in order to build a strong state. Achieving strength in a state is not an easy task, and many countries are failing in their efforts to do this. Greater strength seems to relate to economic development; however, reducing scope without establishing strong institutions in a country will not enable it to encourage development. Iraqi institutions have not been able to limit their scope since 2003. This is because the Iraqi government continued to develop a public sector without working on developing a private sector and Iraq has not established a strong domestic economy. At the same time, Iraq has not been able to establish strong political and economic institutions since 2003. Thus, the new Iraqi governments cannot play a positive role in creating a well-organized government and establishing a strong state in Iraq.

Strong states require an absence of corruption, reliable transparency, and well-organized state institutions. In Iraq, the rate of corruption is very high in all sectors. According to a Transparency International Report, Iraq was listed 157 out of 182 countries in the world for corruption (Trading Economics, 2022).. Moreover, an estimated two trillion of dollars in capital have left the country and at least two million people are externally displaced. Millions of barrels of oil have been smuggled out of the country since 2003, and the latest World Bank estimates are that about thirty per cent of young males in Iraq are unemployed (Crawford, 2020)..

Thus, the process of state-building in Iraq since 2003 has been complex and challenging, marked by a series of successes, setbacks, and ongoing struggles. Iraq's

post-Saddam era has been marked by efforts to build and strengthen various state institutions. This includes the judiciary, the security forces, and other government bodies responsible for essential functions such as education, healthcare, infrastructure, and finance. However, the process of institution-building in Iraq has faced significant problems, such as corruption, lack of transparency, and a disorganized state, which have complicated the political landscape and hampered efforts to create stable institutions. Legitimacy and neighboring interventions have also been persistent issues that have further delayed the development of a strong governing framework in the country.

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بونیاتانی دامه زراوه وهک دهوله تسازی له دهوله ته لاوازه کاندای

عیراق وهک نموونه

پوخته:

ئهم تووژینه وهیه ئامانجی باسکردن و شیکردنه وهی تیگه یشتنی تیورییه له بونیادانی دامه زراوه کانی وهک دهوله ت. تووژینه وهیه که تیگه یشتن و لیکۆلینه وهیه له چه مکی فۆکۆباما بۆ دامه زراوه کان؛ که له چوارچیوهی بونیادانی دهوله ت له عیراقدا جیبه جیبه ده کات. گرنگی بابه ته که له وه دایه، که یه کیکه له بابه ته پر مشتومرپه کان له سیاسه تی هاوچه رخ و په یوه ندییه نیوده وه له تییه کان. له ئاستی میتۆدیییدا شیوازیکی شیکاری سیاسی به کاره پینراوه و داتا کانی تووژینه وهیه که به پشکنینی ژماره یه ک گۆراو مامه له یان له گه لدا کراوه. ئهم تووژینه وهیه باس له وه ده کات، که پرۆسه ی بونیادانی دهوله ت له عیراقدا له سالی 2003 هوه ئالۆز بووه و زۆر ئالنگاری هاتوونه ته به رده می، که به زنجیره یه ک سه رکه وتن و پاشه کسه و مملانیی به رده وام دیاری کراوه. جگه له وهش، عیراقی دوای رووخانی سه دام، به هه ولدان بۆ بونیادنانه وه و به هیژکردنی دامه زراوه جۆراو جۆره کانی دهوله ت ده ناسریتته وه. ئهم دامه زراوانه ش بریتین له ده سه لاتی دادوه ری، هیزه ئه منییه کان و ده زگاکانی تری حکومه ت؛ که به رپرسیارن له ئه رکه سه ره کییه کانی وهک: په روه رده، چاودیاری ته ندروستی، ژیرخانی دارایی، به لام پرۆسه ی بونیادانی دامه زراوه کان له عیراقدا رووبه رووی کیشمه کیشم و کۆمه لیک ئاسته نگ و ئالنگاری بووه نه ته وه، که بریتین له دووبه ره کیی ئیتنیکی و تایفه گه ری، یاخیبوون و کاریگه ری ده ره کی، که سیمای سیاسی ئالۆزتر کردوه و کۆسیی له به رده م هه وله کانی دروستکردنی دامه زراوه ی سه قامگیردا دروستکردوه. هه روه ها گه نده لی و ناکارامه یی پرسه گه لیکه به رده وام بوون، که بوونه ته پیرگر له په ره پیدانی چوارچیوه یه کی به هیزی حوکمرانی. ئهم تووژینه وهیه به و ئه نجامه گه یشتوو، که دامه زراوه سیاسییه کانی عیراق له ریشه وه پارچه پارچه بوون.

بناء المؤسسات كبناء الدولة في الدول الضعيفة العراق كحالة للدراسة

الملخص:

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى مناقشة وتحليل الفهم النظري لبناء المؤسسات على أنها بناء الدولة. يتطرق هذا البحث إلى فهم فوكوياما المفاهيمي للمؤسسات ويطبقه في سياق بناء الدولة في العراق. تكمن أهمية الموضوع في أنه يشكل أحد أكثر الموضوعات إثارة للجدل في السياسة المعاصرة والعلاقات الدولية. اعتمد الباحث على منهج التحليل السياسي وتم التعامل مع بيانات البحث من خلال دراسة عدد من المتغيرات. تذهب هذه الدراسة إلى أن عملية بناء الدولة في العراق منذ عام 2003 كانت معقدة وصعبة، وتميزت بسلسلة من الإنجازات والنكسات والصراعات المستمرة.

علاوة على ذلك، تميز حقبة ما بعد صدام بالجهود المبذولة لبناء وتقوية مؤسسات الدولة المختلفة. تشمل هذه المؤسسات القضاء وقوات الأمن والهيئات الحكومية الأخرى المسؤولة عن الوظائف الأساسية مثل التعليم والرعاية الصحية والبنية التحتية والتمويل. ومع ذلك، واجهت عملية بناء المؤسسات في العراق تحديات كبيرة، من بينها الانقسامات العرقية والطائفية وحركات التمرد والتأثيرات الخارجية التي أدت إلى تعقيد المشهد السياسي وعرقلت الجهود المبذولة لإنشاء مؤسسات مستقرة. كما كان الفساد وعدم الكفاءة من القضايا المستمرة التي أعاققت تطوير إطار حكم قوي. كما خلصت هذه الدراسة إلى أن المؤسسات السياسية العراقية مجزأة إلى حد بعيد.