

Reasons and Consequences for The Obama Administration's policy of Military Withdrawal in Iraq (2009-2017)

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ABSTRACT

In 2011, President Barack Obama announced a policy of military withdrawal from Iraq. This policy aimed to gradually withdraw the majority of US troops from Iraq and transition security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. During the campaign Barack Obama promised an end to the Iraq war. The policy was based on the belief that Iraq's security forces were capable of handling the country's security needs and that a long-term US military presence in Iraq was not necessary. This article attempts to explain several reasons and consequences of the withdrawal. The cost of the war had become unsustainable, the withdrawal started in August 2010, and all US military personnel had left Iraq by December 2011. The decision to withdraw was met with mixed reactions. Supporters argued that the war had become too costly, both in terms of lives and money, and that it was time for Iraq to take responsibility for its own security. Critics argued that a precipitous withdrawal could lead to instability and increased violence in Iraq. In the years following the withdrawal, Iraq experienced a surge in violence, including the Rise of ISIS and Intensifying the ethnic and sectarian conflict and Expansion of Shia militias group in Iraq and growing Iranian influence in Iraq.

Introduction

The Obama administration's military withdrawal policy in Iraq originated from President Obama's campaign promise to withdraw combat brigades from Iraq within 16 months of taking office, leaving a residual force for counterterrorism operations, training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces, and protecting Americans. The reduction of troops was also affected by the Bush administration's 2008 Status of Forces Agreement, which established a schedule for the removal of US forces from Iraq. The military departure permitted President Obama to announce that he was "ending the war in Iraq." The withdrawal of U.S. military forces in Iraq began in December 2007 with the end of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007 and was mostly completed by December 2011, bringing an end to the Iraq War (Serwer, 2008). During his presidential campaign in 2008, Barack Obama announced a change in American foreign policy. For decades, the United States has relied on "reflexive mindsets and obsolete dogmas" in order to drive its policies, ranging from global police efforts to poorly thought-out "nation-building" efforts in countries that the United States has never bothered or cared to comprehend (Cortright, 2015).

Obama intended to reestablish America's ability to intervene more effectively in the arenas where he felt it was most important to do so. He wanted to shift the focus of US trade and investment from the Middle East to the more economically vibrant Asia-Pacific area, where the United States had been heavily involved in military wars for nearly three decade (Brands, 2016). For the first time since the Cold War, America shifted its attention away from Europe's economic and security developments (Gerges, 2012). President Obama proclaimed a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one founded on mutual interest and mutual respect. Regional allies, however, remarked that President Obama did not mention the reciprocal interests that had defined bilateral cooperation for decades, such as energy security and regional stability. Lynch, (2015) claims that Obama had wanted to exploit the contemporary presidency's powers rather than limit them. He had the idea that he could alter

the content of US foreign policy without altering the way it was implemented (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017).

Obama's grand strategy was to maintain US leadership in an eminently favorable international order while doing so at reduced costs through more flexible and energetic diplomacy and in ways that better reflect the shifting landscape of global power. This according to Rose, (2015), ensured the president's own interpretation across a wide range of subjects and areas which were the most constant "big ideas" in Obama's administration. After the George W. Bush administration, the United States benefited greatly from Obama's broad vision. It helped the United States modify and recalibrate its leadership; it better positioned the country to deal with long-term concerns like the emergence of China and global climate change; and it gave the country a strategic break after a period of overexertion (Quinn, 2015). It also pushed policies that had largely positive results, from Iran diplomacy to the American stance in the Asia-Pacific.

However, according to Brands, (2016) Obama's grand strategy was more problematic in other ways. When it was put into action, there were some major and costly setbacks, particularly in the larger Middle East, and it exposed key tensions and limitations at the very foundation of his administration (Lynch, 2015). The United States raised the question of whether Obama had overlearned from his predecessor's blunders and so committed the opposite faults himself on issues such as Iraq and Syria (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017). The American occupation of Iraq continued to raise many issues regarding its legitimacy, the political and military goals behind the real objectives of the occupation, the resultant future results and its influence on the entire world system. As a part of a larger US imperial strategy, the US occupation of Iraq was not only destructive and disintegrating for Iraq's political structure and its economic and social components, but it was also frightening for Iraq's surroundings.

This study aims to address the reasons and consequences for the Obama administration's policy of military withdrawal in Iraq (2009-2017). This study is

significant in that it addresses the issues on whether U.S. withdrawal from Iraq should be conditional rather than connected to a certain political schedule. It does this by carrying out an in-depth assessment of the backlash and consequences caused by the US troop withdrawal policy since 2009-2021. The inconvenient truth is that Iraqi-U.S. failure to effectively manage the U.S. exit and the development of efficient Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is a severe threat to Iraq's future stability and security.

Literature review

During his presidential campaign in 2008, Barack Obama announced a change in American foreign policy. For decades, the United States has relied on "reflexive mindsets and obsolete dogmas" in order to drive its policies, ranging from global police efforts to poorly thought-out "nation-building" efforts in countries that the United States has never bothered or cared to comprehend (Cortright, 2015). Obama intended to reestablish America's ability to intervene more effectively in the arenas where he felt it was most important to do so. According to Davidson, (2021), US-led efforts to transform Iraq from a quasi-socialist dictatorship into a liberal democracy and free-market economy have always been faced with challenges that ended up in failure. The lack of coordination between Iraq's state and society created a barrier between the new Iraqi government and Iraq's rich, delicate cultural and political environment (Wehrey, 2017). The 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq shattered this sectarian power balance, allowing the Shi'a Arabs to rise to unprecedented levels of political dominance through majoritarian democracy. Sectarianism infiltrated deeply into the political and theological rhetoric of the country by the time the United States left in 2011 (Davidson, 2021).

Despite Iraq's myriad of complex and seemingly unsolvable problems, the United States ended its almost nine-year military occupation of the country in December 2011 under the administration of US President Barack Obama (Lindsay, 2011). In 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) unleashed a fatal attack, and the United States re-entered Iraq with a lead role. ISIS' rise in Iraq can be attributed to a number of circumstances (Dunigan, 2014). Existing literature does point to several systemic

failures of the US and Iraqi political elite, including the imposition of imperfect democratic mechanisms and institutions on a state crippled by authoritarian centralisation, the de-Ba'thification of Iraq, the emergence of various insurgent groups and terrorists, and the rapid descent into a cruel sectarianism manifested in political, economic and security failure (Bannon, 2021).

In the fall of 2010, the United States and Iraq began negotiating a new SOFA via videoconferences between Washington and Baghdad and late-night negotiations in the guarded property of then-President's Iraqi counterpart (Connable et al., 2020). According to diplomatic sources, President Obama notified Prime Minister Maliki at the end of June 2011 that up to tens of thousands of U.S. troops will remain in Iraq to train and equip Iraqi security forces (ISF) (Richard Jr et al., 2013). However, it took some time for Mr. Maliki to find a political ally. In the end, he was given the go-ahead to proceed with negotiations with the United States regarding the future of American troops in Iraq (Jensen, 2017). Resuming its session in late November 2011 because of fears that Iraqi courts may deny immunity to leftover US personnel, the Iraqi parliament (just before the year-end evacuation date). Sadrist reprisals and Iraq's preparations for a power transfer from American soldiers were the main issues (Thomas et al., 2021). The Bush administration and the Iraqi government negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which granted legal immunities to US troops in the country but also required their withdrawal by the end of 2011.

President Obama's withdrawal policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East involved a shift away from the interventionist tactics of the Bush administration towards a more multilateral and non-interventionist approach (Taylor, 2016). The policy aimed to reduce the US military presence in the region, limit the scope of US military engagements, and focus on building stronger diplomatic ties with regional partners. In terms of Iraq, the Obama administration implemented a phased withdrawal of US troops from the country, which began in 2009 and was completed by the end of 2011. The withdrawal was based on the premise that the US military had accomplished its primary objectives in Iraq, which were to oust Saddam Hussein's regime, establish a

democratic government, and train and equip Iraqi security forces to maintain stability in the country (Brands, 2016).

According to Brands, (2016) Obama's grand strategy of disengagement was more problematic in other ways. When it was put into action, there were some major and costly setbacks, particularly in the larger Middle East, and it exposed key tensions and limitations at the very foundation of his administration (Lynch, 2015). As for the United States' global position, it raised the question of whether Obama had overlearned from his predecessor's blunders and so committed the opposite faults himself on issues such as Iraq and Syria (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017). A major question mark loomed over Obama's grand strategic legacy, as well as American grand strategy in general, after his victory as president by a landslide margin in November 2016 (Brands, 2016).

President Obama's withdrawal policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East involved a shift away from the interventionist tactics of the Bush administration towards a more multilateral and non-interventionist approach. The policy aimed to reduce the US military presence in the region, limit the scope of US military engagements, and focus on building stronger diplomatic ties with regional partners. In terms of Iraq, the Obama administration implemented a phased withdrawal of US troops from the country, which began in 2009 and was completed by the end of 2011. The withdrawal was based on the premise that the US military had accomplished its primary objectives in Iraq, which were to oust Saddam Hussein's regime, establish a democratic government, and train and equip Iraqi security forces to maintain stability in the country (Lynch 2016).

Additionally, the Obama administration sought to disengage from other conflicts in the Middle East, such as the civil war in Syria. Rather than engaging in direct military intervention, the administration sought to provide aid and support to moderate opposition groups and work towards a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The overall aim of the Obama administration's disengagement policy in the Middle East was to reduce the US military's involvement in the region and shift towards a more

collaborative and multilateral approach to addressing regional challenges. The policy was motivated by the belief that the interventionist tactics of the Bush administration had done irreparable damage to US credibility in the region and that a different approach was needed to restore stability and security (Gvosdev, N. K. (2016).

The military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 did contribute to intensifying ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the country. The withdrawal created a power vacuum that allowed various factions to compete for power, resources, and influence. The absence of US troops and security measures left Iraq vulnerable to violence, and various extremist groups, including Sunni and Shiite militias, emerged to take advantage of the situation. One of the main causes of the intensification of ethnic and sectarian conflicts after the military withdrawal was the failure of the Iraqi government to establish an inclusive and effective political system that could accommodate the diverse interests and needs of the country's different ethnic and religious groups. This failure created an environment in which different groups, including Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites, competed for power and resources, often resorting to violence to achieve their goals(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022).

The fall of Mosul and the collapse of most of the Iraqi army led to the expansion of the Shia militia backed by Iran in Iraq, under the name of the 'popular mobilization', further increasing the instability and sectarian polarization between Shia and Sunnis. After the US withdrawal, the Shia militia group expanded its influence, filling the security vacuum left by the departing US troops. This development raised concerns in the US administration regarding the growth of terrorist groups and the creation of a terrorist 'safe haven' which would jeopardize US interests in the region. In reaction to these accelerated developments, the Obama administration's new course of action towards Iraq concentrated on confronting ISIL, and so in August 2014, the US started conducting airstrikes against ISIL(BBC, 2013).

The growth of Shia militias in Iraq has also had significant regional and international implications. The rise of these groups has been a source of concern for Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors, who see them as a proxy for Iran and a threat to their own security.

The militias have also been accused of carrying out human rights abuses and of contributing to sectarian violence, further exacerbating tensions between Iraq's Sunni and Shia communities. The growth of Shia militias in Iraq has also been a source of concern for the international community, particularly the United States and its allies (Al-Azmeh, A.,2013). The US had been engaged in a long-standing conflict with Iran, and the rise of Shia militias in Iraq has been seen as a means for Iran to expand its influence in the region. This has raised concerns about the stability of Iraq and the wider region, and has led to calls for the Iraqi government to take steps to rein in the militias and to ensure that they operate within the law

After the United States withdrew from Iraq in 2011, Iran saw an opportunity to expand its influence in Iraq. Iran's strategy involved supporting and strengthening the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, which were already present in the country and had been fighting against US forces during the occupation (Al-Tamimi,2018). The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 provided an additional opportunity for Iran to expand its influence in Iraq. Iran sent its Quds Force and other proxy forces to support the Syrian regime, and many of these forces also operated in Iraq (International Security, 2015). These forces included units composed of fighters from pro-Iranian Iraqi militias, such as the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade and the Dhu al-Fiqar Brigade, as well as fighters from Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite units from Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2014, when ISIS took over large areas of Iraq, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the senior Shiite cleric in Iraq, called for the establishment of a popular mobilization force (Al-Hashd al-Sha'abi) to help the Iraqi army fight against ISIS. The pro-Iranian militias integrated into this force and became the dominant force, also integrating into the Iraqi security establishment and benefiting from funding and logistical assistance from the Iraqi government. The US withdrawal from Iraq created a power vacuum that Iran was able to exploit, allowing it to expand its influence in the country through its support of pro-Iranian militias and political maneuvering (Gause, 2018).

The military consequences of Iranian leadership on Iraq have been significant and far-reaching. Iran has used its military presence in the country to shape its security policy and to project its power and influence beyond its own borders. While this has had

some positive consequences, it has also contributed to tensions and conflicts within Iraq and has had broader regional implications. Certainly, In the years following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, Iran has sought to expand its military influence in the country. It provided assistance to various Iraqi militias and armed groups, including those that have been involved in fighting against ISIS. This allowed Iran to increase its military presence in Iraq and to exert greater control over the country's security (Al-Jaff, & Al-Tamimi, 2018).

There is a lack of research on the security issues Iraq has experienced since the US soldiers left. Research might focus on the emergence of insurgent organizations like ISIS, how they take advantage of security gaps, and how this affects the stability of Iraq. Understanding the post-withdrawal security environment and the initiatives taken to resolve these issues would be helpful in understanding the policy's effects.

Methodology

This thesis's approach was established following careful consideration of the relevant literature and the desired outcomes of the research. This study relied on relevant secondary sources for its findings. The decision to make use of secondary data is based on the fact that the research on previous occurrences and experiences has been carried out to a significant extent in several other studies. As a result, this information is readily accessible and readily available. The researcher considered the available time and resources for the investigation. The term "secondary data" refers to information that has already been gathered and used, such as information from previous studies of similar processes that have been published. In the current research, a chronological analysis of events will be performed in order to investigate the progression of antagonistic political, economic, and social relationships that developed as a direct consequence of the withdrawal policy. The research utilized time series analysis in order to understand and determine how the US policy of withdrawal led to more instability in Iraq. This was done by checking the number of casualties over time during the period of this study. The goal of this research was to understand and determine how the US policy of withdrawal led to more instability in Iraq. To be more specific, the attention was placed on previously published research

that were based on times of heightened political tension in the country. The data obtained from secondary sources went through a process called content analysis before being interpreted. The purpose of content analysis, as a method of conducting research, is to determine the existence of particular concepts, themes, or words within a particular set of qualitative data.

Discussion

There are several reasons that led United States withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. This part will provide a detailed explanation of the key reasons behind the withdrawal of US military forces from Iraq, which include preserving public opinion inside the US, fulfilling Obama's election campaign promise to withdraw from Iraq, and pressure from Congress. And it will explore how the pressure from public opinion and Congress varied throughout Obama's presidency and how it influenced his decision to withdraw troops from Iraq. Furthermore, the chapter will discuss Obama's disengagement policy in the Middle East and his rebalancing policy toward the Asia Pacific region. This section will further examine the reasons behind Obama's shift in focus and how it impacted US foreign policy in the region.

Reasons for Withdrawal

The issue of military withdrawal from Iraq was a highly controversial topic during the presidency of Barack Obama. Public opinion in the United States was divided on this issue, with some supporting Obama's policy of withdrawal and others opposing it. On one hand, those who supported the policy of military withdrawal from Iraq argued that the prolonged military presence in the country was not achieving its intended goals and was instead causing more harm than good (Cortright, 2015). They believed that the US military was not making any significant progress in terms of establishing stability and security in Iraq, and that the continued presence of US troops was only serving to fuel anti-American sentiment among the Iraqi population. Furthermore, they argued that the cost of the war in terms of both human lives and financial resources was too high, and that it was time for the US to bring its troops home and focus on other priorities.

On the other hand, those who opposed the policy of military withdrawal from Iraq argued that a premature withdrawal of US troops would leave a power vacuum in the country, which could be filled by extremist groups and result in further instability and violence. They believed that the US had a moral obligation to ensure that the Iraqi people were safe and secure, and that withdrawing troops too soon could lead to a resurgence of terrorism and other security threats in the region (Brands, 2016). Furthermore, they argued that the US had made significant investments in Iraq in terms of blood and treasure and that abandoning the country now would send a negative message to other US allies and undermine US credibility on the global stage.

Despite these differing opinions, public opinion on the issue of military withdrawal from Iraq was heavily influenced by a number of other factors, including the state of the economy, the success of the military operations in Iraq, and the overall mood of the country (Gerges, 2012). For example, during the early years of the Obama presidency, the US was still recovering from the global financial crisis, and many Americans were focused on economic issues rather than foreign policy. At the same time, the US military had made some significant gains in Iraq, and there was a general feeling of optimism about the future of the country. (Brands, 2016). In light of these developments, public opinion on the issue of military withdrawal from Iraq shifted, and many Americans began to support Obama's policy of withdrawal. A growing number of people believed that it was time for the US to bring its troops home and focus on other priorities, and that the continued military presence in Iraq was not worth the cost in terms of lives and resources (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017).

Further, it can be said that the congress played central role to push Obama administration to withdrawal its military forces form Iraq.in Congress, Democrats were the primary proponents of a withdrawal from Iraq, and they used their control of the House and Senate to push for a timetable for withdrawal. After Obama was elected president, Congress passed a bill in 2009 that required the withdrawal of most US troops from Iraq by August 2010. While the deadline was eventually extended, it demonstrated the strong push from Congress for a withdrawal of troops from Iraq

(Landler, 2011). Additionally, along with public opinion and congressional pressure, anti-war activism also played a role in pushing for a withdrawal from Iraq.

Consequences of the Withdrawal

The issue of military withdrawal from Iraq also had significant political implications, with both the Democratic and Republican parties taking different positions on the issue. The Democrats, who were in the majority during Obama's presidency, generally supported the policy of military withdrawal from Iraq, viewing it as a way to end a costly and unpopular war and redirect resources towards domestic priorities such as healthcare and education (Rose, 2015). They also saw the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq as a step towards restoring the US's image as a responsible global actor that respected the sovereignty of other nations.

The issue of military withdrawal from Iraq was a complex and highly controversial issue during the presidency of Barack Obama, with far-reaching implications for US foreign policy and national security. Throughout Obama's presidency, there were numerous protests and demonstrations in support of ending the war, including the March on Washington for Peace in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009. These demonstrations put pressure on both Obama and Congress to take action on the issue. While the intensity of the pressure varied at different points during his presidency, the consistent message from these groups was that the US needed to end the war and bring its troops home (Tarnoff, C., & Weed, 2014).

As a result of a U.S. troop withdrawal, both U.S. and global aid and economy of Iraq was affected. In order for Iraq to recover from the conflict with the Islamic State, foreign aid is seen as a critical component (Gibson, 2016). There was a negative impact on program management and oversight as a result of an 80 percent reduction in staff at the US Agency for International Development's Iraq mission location (Cordesman, 2020). US aid programs rely on US military presence, either indirectly to stabilize the country or directly to protect and move people around, and if the US troop presence were to be removed, these programs would be in jeopardy (Ramazan, 2018). At a time when Iraqi security forces are already dealing with increased obstacles and costs, military withdrawal meant less external funding and a greater

exposure to U.S.-Iran sanctions (Bloomfield & Harvey, 2017). Withdrawal would put Iraq's government at risk and require it to choose between keeping a strong security force and harming its own economy, while increasing Iraq's reliance on China, Russia, and Iran. The withdrawal created opportunity for benefiting the United States' rivals economically, but it had disastrous for Iraq's economy and stability as a whole. The Iraqi economy has made some progress, and there is room for substantial expansion. However, insufficient investment, infrastructure deterioration, corruption, insecurity, and insecurity impede economic growth.

The withdrawal of U.S. troops consequences included, political, economic, security and social aspects. It created a power vacuum in Iraq that was ultimately filled by ISIS. The U.S. military presence had helped to keep these tensions in check, but with the withdrawal of troops, the country was left to deal with these deep-seated divisions on its own. This withdrawal marked a significant shift in the country's political landscape and opened the door for other regional powers to exert influence.

Conclusion

America invaded Iraq some decades ago is now in the public domain. The deployment and the subsequent withdrawal of the troops under Barack Obama administration had catastrophic consequences on the countries' political, economic, and security systems. Hence, whether one supports invasion or not, one issue that many political scholars agree on is that the management of the entire process has produced a civil war that can only be remedied through political or military options. The Obama policy of military withdrawal from Iraq in 2009 had both reasons and consequences that continue to shape the political and security landscape of Iraq and the broader Middle East. The decision to withdraw US troops was motivated by a desire to end a costly and divisive war, reduce the US military footprint in the region, and shift the focus of US foreign policy towards other global challenges. However, the withdrawal also created a power vacuum that contributed to increased instability, violence, and sectarian conflict in Iraq, which in turn had far-reaching implications for the region's security and stability. The intensification of ethnic and sectarian conflicts, the rise of extremist groups, and the humanitarian crisis that followed the withdrawal

underscored the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. The consequences of the military withdrawal also highlighted the limits of US power and influence in the region, the complexities of regional politics, and the need for inclusive and effective political systems that can accommodate the diverse interests and needs of different groups. Despite the challenges and consequences of the military withdrawal, the US remained engaged in Iraq through diplomatic, economic, and military means. The US continued to provide support to the Iraqi government and security forces in the fight against extremist groups, including ISIS. The experience of the Iraq war and the subsequent withdrawal also informed US foreign policy in the region, prompting a reassessment of the effectiveness of military intervention and the importance of diplomatic and economic engagement in promoting stability and security.

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سیاسه‌تی ئیداره‌ی ئوباما بۆ کشانه‌وه‌ی سه‌ربازی له عێراق: هۆکار و ده‌رئه‌نجامه‌کانی (٢٠١٧-٢٠٠٩)

پوخته:

له ساڵی ٢٠١١ سه‌رۆک باراک ئوباما سیاسه‌تی کشانه‌وه‌ی سه‌ربازی له عێراق ڕاگه‌یاند. ئه‌م بڕیاره‌ی تاراڤه‌یه‌کی زۆر له‌سه‌ر بنه‌مای رێککه‌وتنه‌نامه‌ی باری هێزه‌کانی ساڵی ٢٠٠٨ بوو که له لایه‌ن به‌رپوه‌به‌رایه‌تی (بوش)ه‌وه به سه‌رکه‌وتووبی دانوستانی له‌سه‌ر کرا و به‌پێی ئه‌و بڕیاره خسته‌ی کاتی کشانه‌وه‌ی هێزه‌کانی ئه‌مریکای دانا. ئامانجی ئه‌م سیاسه‌ته زۆرینه‌ی هێزه‌کانی ئه‌مریکا له عێراق ورده ورده بکشیته‌وه و به‌رپرسیاریتی سه‌ربازی ڕاده‌ست به هێزه عێراقیه‌کان بکریت. له کاتی هه‌لمه‌تی هه‌لبژاردنه‌کاندا (باراک ئوباما) به‌ئینی دا کۆتایی به شه‌ری عێراق به‌پنیت، سیاسه‌ته‌که له‌سه‌ر ئه‌و باوه‌رپه‌ بوو که هێزه سه‌ربازییه‌کانی عێراق ده‌توانن هه‌لسوکه‌وت له‌گه‌ڵ پێداووستیی ئاسایشی وڵاته‌که یان بکه‌ن و بوونی سه‌ربازی ئه‌مریکا بۆ ماوه‌یه‌کی درێژخایه‌ن له عێراق پێویست نییه. ئه‌م بابته هه‌ول ده‌دات سیاسه‌تی ئیداره‌ی ئوباما وه‌وکار و ده‌رئه‌نجامه‌کانی کشانه‌وه‌که ڕوون بکاته‌وه، وه‌ک: یه‌که‌م: ملکه‌چبوون بۆ پای گشتی خه‌لک له ئه‌مریکادا بوو هۆی کشانه‌وه‌ی له عێراق، دووه‌م:

سياسة تي خؤبه ده ستنه داني ئه مريكا له رؤژه لاتي ناوه راست و عيراق له سه رده مي به ريوه به رايه تي ئوباما و سبيهم: نيچووي شه ركه ناتوانرئيت به ردوام بيئت له بهر ئه وها كشانه وه كه له مانكي ئابي 2010 ده ستي بيكرد و تا مانكي كانوني دووه مي 2011 هه موو كارمه نده سه ربازيه كاني ئه مريكا عيراقيان به جيئه نشت. برياري كشانه وه كه كاردانه وه ي تيكه لاوي به خؤبه وه بيني.. لايه نگراني رايانگه ياند كه شه ركه له پرووي گيان و پاره وه زور تيچوو ليكه وتوو هه وه و كاتي ئه وه هاتوو عيراق به رپرسيارئي ئاسايشي خؤي له ئه ستؤ بگريئت. دژبه ركه كان ده يانگوت كشانه وه ي خيرا ده توانيئت بيته هؤي ناسه قامگيري و زيادبووني توندوتيژي له عيراق، له سالاني دواي كشانه وه ي عيراق شابه تي هه لكشاني توندوتيژي بوو له وانه سه ره لداني داعش دواي كشانه وه ي هيژه كاني ئه مريكا، زيادبووني مملانيئي نه ژادي و مه زه به ي، فراوانبووني ميليشيا شيعه كان له عيراق و گه شه سه ندي كاريگه ري ئيران له عيراق دا.

سياسة إدارة أوباما للانسحاب العسكري في العراق: الأسباب والنتائج (2009-2017)

الملخص:

في عام 2011، أعلن الرئيس باراك أوباما سياسة الانسحاب العسكري من العراق. واعتمد قرار الانسحاب هذا إلى حد كبير على اتفاق مركز القوات لعام 2008 التي تم التفاوض عليها بنجاح من قبل إدارة بوش، والتي بموجبها حددت الجدول الزمني لانسحاب القوات الأمريكية، وتهدف هذه السياسة إلى سحب غالبية القوات الأمريكية تدريجياً من العراق ونقل المسؤوليات الأمنية إلى القوات العراقية. خلال الحملة تعهد باراك أوباما بإنهاء حرب العراق، استندت السياسة إلى الاعتقاد بأن قوات الأمن العراقية قادرة على التعامل مع الاحتياجات الأمنية للبلاد وأن الوجود العسكري الأمريكي طويل الأمد في العراق لم يكن ضرورياً. يحاول هذا المقال شرح أسباب ونتائج الانسحاب مثل: أولاً: الرضوخ للرأي العام داخل الولايات المتحدة دفع بالانسحاب من العراق، وثانياً: سياسة فك الارتباط الأمريكية خلال إدارة أوباما في الشرق الأوسط والعراق. وثالثاً: أصبحت تكلفة الحرب غير قابلة للاستمرار، وبدأ الانسحاب في آب 2010، وغادر جميع الأفراد العسكريين الأمريكيين العراق بحلول كانون الأول 2011. وقد قوبل قرار الانسحاب بردود فعل متباينة. تحدث المؤيدون بأن الحرب أصبحت مكلفة للغاية من حيث الأرواح والمال، وأنه حان الوقت للعراق لتحمل مسؤوليته الأمنية. وقال المعارضون بأن الانسحاب السريع يمكن أن يؤدي إلى عدم الاستقرار وزيادة العنف في العراق. في السنوات التي أعقبت الانسحاب شهد العراق تصاعداً في أعمال العنف، بما في ذلك صعود داعش بعد انسحاب القوات الأمريكية وازدياد الصراع العرقي والطائفي وتوسع الميليشيات الشيعية في العراق وتنامي النفوذ الإيراني في العراق.