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The Interaction Between Economics and Politics in Rentier States

Ribaz Chato Biro
Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Law, Political Science, and Management, Soran University, Soran District, Kurdistan Region, Iraq
ribaz.biro@soran.edu.iq

Almas Heshmati
Jönköping International Business School (JIBS), Jönköping University, Jönköping, Sweden
almas.heshmati@ju.se

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ABSTRACT

In states where income is mainly derived from rent, it is crucial to consider the relationship between politics and economics to appreciate these nations' dynamics and creating successful strategies. This research extensively explores the complex relationship between politics and economics in rentier states, with a specific emphasis on how this dynamic affects governance, economic strategies, and socioeconomic growth. The interaction between these two fields holds significant implications for the general welfare and sustainability of these nations. A key takeaway from the study is the critical need to balance economic pursuits with political stability, while being mindful of the outcomes of the interplay between economics and politics in these nations. The researchers employed a qualitative approach and thoroughly analyzed a diverse range of primary and secondary sources, leading to several significant discoveries. Notably, the study found a high positive relationship between economic and political factors in rentier states.

1. Introduction

The notion of a “rentier state” has its roots in the research of economists, and the phrase “rent” is employed to designate the payments made to the landlord. Land rentals can generate revenue for the owner even when no asset is reproduced.

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Additionally, the owners make no constructive efforts and are paid according to how the resources are utilized. Therefore, the idea of a rentier state was first based on the definition of rent provided by David Ricardo and his theory of land rent in the eighteenth century. The term “rentier state” refers, in today’s context, to a nation that derives a significant percentage of its revenue from the export of mineral wealth, particularly oil and natural gas (Kama,2015).

The significance of the interplay between economics and politics in rentier states is multifaceted, encompassing factors such as the maintenance of economic and political stability, the management of governance-related complexities, the pursuit of economic diversification, and the handling of international relations. Maintaining economic stability is crucial to ensuring a sustainable economy and minimizing the potential hazards that may arise from excessive dependence on a single source of income. Additionally, the maintenance of political power and legitimacy is based on political stability, whereas governance challenges have the potential to cause corruption, rent-seeking practices, and other governance-related difficulties. The significance of economic diversification lies in its ability to expand economies beyond the limits of resource extraction and export. Additionally, foreign policies, regional engagements, and interactions with global economic institutions can be influenced by international relations (Kaya, *et al*., 2019).

A theoretical paradigm known as the “rentier state approach” aims to show how foreign rent affects the governance of the national community. Although they hold substantial hydrocarbons, Arab oil-producing states have been the subject of rentier state analysis since the late 1960s. The very first analyst who referred to rentier states was Mahdavy (1970), who frequently applied the word to refer to Iran. Hazem Bablawi and Giacomo Luciani (1987), writing on the Arab oil states later in the 1980s, utilized the phrase and the methodology.

The research inquiry refers to the fundamental determinants that account for the divergent levels of political stability in rentier states, and the consequential effects of such equilibrium on their economic and governance outcomes. The present study goes into an evaluation of the interplay between the disciplines of economics and politics in rentier states. The objective is to demonstrate the obstacles and outcomes of this interplay and its significance in developing the economic and governmental context of rentier states. The study addresses various key subjects, including conceptualization, economics, politics, governance, and interaction patterns. This study aims to present a comprehensive elucidation of rentier states and their unique features. It will delve into the historical evolution of rentierism, scrutinize the economic factors that typify rentier states, inspect the political dimensions of rentier states, cover the governance in rentier states, and evaluate the interplay between the factors.

2. Literature Review

The term rentier state first emerged in the 1970s. Mahdavi (1970) is one of the first users of this term as he used it in an article regarding the economic system of Iran and the concept of external rent in an article entitled "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in the Rentier States." Mahdavi believed that rent is a gift given by nature through natural resources, which are available in all economies in different ways, such as selling natural resources, foreign direct investment, and labor remittances. Moreover, Mahdavi highlighted that foreign rental incomes could also be paid by vessels that travel from the Suez Canal and payment to those countries that transit natural resources like gas pipelines and railway transportation of coal and minerals.

Bebalwi and Luciani (1987) worked further on the rentier theory and started to conduct a comparative analysis of the rentier economy of the gulf states. They described several essential features and conditions for a country to be classified as a rentier state. The first element is that if a country receives all of its income from abroad by selling its natural resources, it is a rentier state. Moreover, in such economies, rent generation is generally under the control of a few political elites rather than the majority of the labor force or its representatives.

However, in this type of economy, most people seek advantages from non-economic activities provided by the rentier state, such as licenses, monopolies of markets, contracts, and grants. Lastly, in this kind of economy, most people rely only on this source of income, and there is no competitive market. Beblawi (1990) classified

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rentier states into two levels. The first level is the purest rentier states, which earn all their income from selling natural resources. The second grade is a semi-rentier state that does not own natural resources but provides military bases on their land to other states for financial gains. Thus, the land is a natural resource and a source of rentier income.

According to Waldner and Smith (2013), there are a few differences between the regular source of income, like taxation, agricultural productions, and industrial goods, and substantial rents from foreign parties. No considerable effort is required to receive the later amount of rent. Moreover, it does not push the labor market to be competitive and productive as the natural resources are extractive. Therefore, it is clear that the individuals in a rentier state only see the outcomes and not the efforts, making them over-reliant on quickly earned money like petrodollars extracted by foreign labor and capital.

Herb (2019) argues that the distribution of oil revenue to the economy of golf states has led to their citizens being assured of high living standards. Foreign rents in the rentier states are distributed among individuals through public employment, annual payments, and other subsidies. These allocation plans increased the dominance of the regimes to run their countries. Furthermore, by wealth distribution, they have bought the loyalty of certain groups to face the rival groups within their territory. On the one hand, as the quality of life was growing up, on the other hand, the oil depletable reserve kept decreasing.

Moreover, the fluctuation of oil prices hardening the governments' plans, and the advancement of technology has the potential to weaken the world's dependency on the oil of the Gulf states. These states have built a type of economy that cannot be reformed because the benefits of the political elites would be threatened. As a result, during the oil price shock, the Gulf states have decreased their spending instead of diversifying their economy to reduce their dependency on foreign rent.

In most of the Gulf states, there are social contracts between the regime and its population regarding the distribution of wealth. Thus, these social contracts determine how foreign revenue is distributed among individuals. It is not only about paying salaries to individuals employed as public servants. It is more about several

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subsidies by the state to its citizens, including free healthcare, free education, employment in the public sector, pensions, and so forth. Therefore, the state starts to monopolize the country's whole economy and political structure, which decreases the democracy indicators in a society (Beblawi, 1990). In short, there is no proper taxation system to finance public services and development infrastructures; instead, the state finances public services provision using rentier income. At the same time, the alliance of politics and business uses the public service provision channel to transfer the public budget to the monopolized business sector as part of business development and not a part of the strategy for national interest development.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argued that different states prefer diverse political structures based on their interests, cultures, and beliefs in determining how political power and resources are distributed. Similarly, Kuru (2014) believed that there are different aspects of governance in rentier states. He first said that foreign rents are not the main element of authoritarianism in the Muslim states, as the undeveloped and small states are authoritarian. Afterward, he argued that democracy and a high rate of natural resources interact positively in most of the states in Latin America. Lastly, he added that culture, patriarchy, religion, and institutional structures are the critical points of the non-democratic feature of Muslim rentier states.

Auty (1993) first coined the phrase *resource curse* in 1993 to explain how resource-rich states could not employ their Petro-dollars to expand their economies. He added that these countries experienced poorer growth in the economy than those with a lack of natural resources. He believed that the resource curse negatively impacts a country's economic growth. Countries facing the curse may predict real exchange rate improvement that has a detrimental impact on specific major industries and increased instability. Nonetheless, they believed that the availability of non-renewable resources is linked to a tendency for civil strife.

Almaz (2015) argued why certain governments have poor economic performance and democratic issues while they possess a high level of natural resources. He believed that the resource curse approach tends to be a valuable technique for assessing how the abundance of natural resources affects institutions, governance, and economic performance in resource-rich countries. He believed that resource-rich countries are at a higher frequently dealing with various problems like low levels of democracy, weak sustainable development, and domestic or international conflicts, all of which are the outcome of the mismanagement of natural resources.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Dutch Disease Theory

The *Dutch Disease* is the principal definition offered by economists, albeit not unique. In 1977, the phrase was invented by economists, which attributed to the harmful impacts of natural resources on the manufacturing sector of the Netherlands after the discovery of oil and gas in Groningen in 1960s. According to the Dutch disease theory, resource-rich countries have a poor level of economic growth since income inflows drive exchange rate increases. This may impact the manufacturing sector due to expenditure and capital transfer impacts, causing a reduction in manufacturing's proportion of the economy (Shehabi, 2020).

Taguchi and Khinsamone (2018) believe that governments can reduce the threat of Dutch Disease by saving the windfall or investment abroad like what Venezuela, Kuwait, and Norway have already executed. They also argued that state authorities could decrease the obstacles to improving the tradable sector in two directions. Either they can implement strategic industrialization plans like what Indonesia and Algeria have done, or they may develop the rural areas like Indonesia and the Islamic Republic of Iran have concluded.

According to the theoretical framework, a rise in resource exports is associated with many interrelated consequences. Initially, the increase in income generated by the exportation of resources bolsters the nation's currency, thereby reducing the competitiveness of its non-resource industries, such as agriculture or manufacturing, in the international marketplace. The phenomenon of "crowding out" is observed when the flourishing resource industry attracts workers and assets, leading to a downturn in the other industries. Subsequently, the rise in resource-generated income typically results in a rising of the currency's value. The increase in currency valuation causes export expenses, impeding non-resource industries' competitive edge (Bjørnland, *et al.*, 2019).

The oil and gas sector, known for its relatively low labor intensity compared to other sectors, may not be capable of providing adequate employment opportunities to accommodate the labor force relocated from industries experiencing a decline. The mentioned circumstance has the potential to result in joblessness or insufficient employment, specifically in remote regions or among individuals with lower levels of expertise. The Dutch disease theory posits that the reliance on exporting natural resources can result in instability in government incomes due to the unpredictable fluctuations of resource prices in the global marketplace. The presence of volatility can lead to an uncertain fiscal setting, posing challenges for governments in devising and executing sustainable development plans over extended periods (Cust, *et al*., 2019).

3.2 Resource Curse Theory

The "resource curse," often referred to as the "paradox of plenty" is an economic theory that contends that nations with abundant natural resources seem to have less efficient economic development, greater levels of inequality, and weak governance than those with less abundant resources. The theoretical framework emphasizes the adverse outcomes that are linked to the ignoring or improper distribution of natural resource assets (Mignamissi, and Kuete, 2021). Erum and Hussain (2019) highlighted that corruption is a subcategory of the recourse curse. Corruption is the outcome of weak governance that spoils the economic development in a rentier state. The affluence of natural resources boosts corruption due to the low performance of government institutions, leading to a decrement in government productivity and performance and a poor democracy. Sumah (2018) stated that corruption impacts both economic development and society. In his view, this phenomenon can prevent economic development, investment, and employment. It will reduce tax income due to lacking accountability and transparency and a decrease in trust in the law and regulations and their enforcement.

Transparency is critical in reducing the resource curse's negative consequences. Corruption and favoritism may be reduced if organizational performance is improved via transparency, which makes facts on resource income gathering and expenditure publicly available. As a result of the development of multiple global efforts, extractive governments may be forced to enhance their institutional performance, transparency and accountability. Furthermore, as a foundation of economic development, solid and efficient governmental entities might improve human resource development to support productivity and growth (Bak, 2020).

Gengler, *et al.,* (2021) argued that natural resources are the main element of decrement in accountability, which leads to a low rate of economic development in a rentier state. Developed states tax their population, which needs accountability and transparency, but in rentier states, taxation either does not exist or, at a low level applied to public servants as saving to finance their pensions. Therefore, this issue leads to political violence and will threaten the regime stability, and may lead to domestic violence, terrorist activities, and in some cases, revolutions with radical regime changes as an outcome. They also highlighted that oil revenue makes political officials dominant over the resource sector and increases their power in the state's politics and economy. Therefore, in the rentier states, the need for taxation is low as it will decrease the power of ruling elites and their profits from taxable business revenues.

4. Political Factors in Rentier States

The political system in a rentier state is characterized by several factors negatively impacting the performance of the rentier economies. These include, in particular, governance, institutions, corruption, and politics/business vs. national interest-driven development strategies which affect economic development. Good governance affects political stability, which leads to organized production and economic development. Besides, stability fuels organizational improvement and economic growth (Gengler,2015).

The influence of political factors is of utmost significance in determining the dynamics and consequences of rentier states. The management and allocation of revenues generated from natural resources by political elites can have significant implications for power dynamics, patronage networks, and the overall stability of the ruling regime. However, it may also result in restricted pluralism in politics, fragile

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institutions, and restricted political involvement. The Rentier Bargain and Social Contracts can play a crucial role in shaping the legitimacy of the ruling regime and the social stability of a nation (Al-Sarihi, and Cherni, 2022).

Kudaibergenova, and Laruelle, (2022) investigated the post-soviet rentier states Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Their results revealed that both nations had vast gas and oil reserves, limited economic growth, and powerful authoritarian governments with patronage networks. Two additional characteristics were observed. To begin with, these organizations had a small range of political interest groups. Second, the people were structured in a hierarchical form. However, they found out that apart from the features of the rentier state model, there is a strong personality cult among citizens dedicated to its leader. Furthermore, politicians are not protectors of the rentier state model. They are relatively intensely loyal to their leader.

Denton (2022) stressed the positive relationship between natural resource exports and authoritarianism. Furthermore, he divided the rent implications into three aspects. First, the ‘rentier impacts’ (the removal of financial interaction between a government and society). Then,’ oppression impact’ (a considerable amount of rent goes to the security apparatuses of the regime). Later, the ‘development effect’ (foreign rents bring about the deterioration of political and economic improvement).

The aforementioned studies and case analyses offer valuable insights into the complex dynamics of rentier states, elucidating the distinctive features and effects of their economic and political structures. The results of these researches provide valuable insights into the rentier state framework and its impact on governance, authoritarianism, and economic progress.

Masuku (2023) argued that to guarantee control over resource wealth and preserve public support, political leaders in rentier governments can deploy nationalist ideologies and practices. The phenomenon of political rent-seeking and corruption has the potential to result in the misallocation of resources, embezzlement, and the redirection of resources from government services and development initiatives. Resource exploitation, commerce, and political collaboration all have a substantial impact on politics and global interactions, hence affecting national politics.

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Ibadoghlu (2022) explored the association between regime durability and oil revenue, starting from the 60s until the late 90s. He said that regime survival in a rentier state is strongly related to oil income, regardless of social dissatisfaction. If oil revenues increase, the regimes put more effort into surviving. If, the price decrease, the regime will be in danger, which means that their regimes are unstable. Csicsmann, and Rozsa, (2022) used different methodologies to find the connection between rentier features and regime survival in Iraq, Indonesia, Iran, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. She stated that statecraft is the descriptive element for regime survival among rentier states who face economic difficulties. Moreover, they demonstrated that the rulers' decisions are at the same level as systemic components of political products. She believed that the institutional frameworks in the given states are just informal and that all decisions are made by their leaders.

In rentier nations, patronage politics are a key aspect of the political scene. The term refers to the act of political elites utilizing the allocation of state resources and benefits to uphold and strengthen their power structure, obtain political backing, and guarantee allegiance from significant stakeholders. The rents obtained from natural resources offer political elites a considerable amount of easy money that can be utilized to establish and maintain patronage networks, distribute rents to exert political control and co-optation, engage in rent-seeking actions, and promote state employment and rentierism. Rent-seeking refers to the practice of seeking economic or political gains through channels that are not related to productive activities. This practice can result in ineffective distribution of funds, preference, and corruption (Patel, 2022). Africa's resource curse concept is shown by nations like South Africa and Zimbabwe, both of which have huge reserves but are unable to employ them for the socioeconomic liberation of their citizens. In reality, as their resources are exploited and sold to developed nations, hunger levels are rising (Olayele 2016).

In states characterized by rentierism, political allegiance is frequently linked to the acquisition of rents and associated benefits. The ruling class typically institutes a system of patronage that incentivizes loyalty and conformity, while penalizing or marginalizing those who express different opinions. This phenomenon serves to strengthen the rentier social contract, whereby individuals offer political backing and

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adherence in return for the opportunity to use resources and social welfare initiatives. The practice of patronage politics in rentier states can potentially have adverse impacts on governance by harming the principles of the merit system, accountability, and openness of governmental bodies. Political connections can impede the growth of a competitive private sector by allocating resources and opportunities based on non-market factors (Thiollet, 2022).

Bali (2018), focused on the term patronage and neo-patrimonialism. She further stated that in weak governments, the interested groups with links with the ruling class benefit from the state’s legal and government organization weaknesses. He also examined the root of clientelism alongside corruption in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. However, he added that the patron-client system in KRI is made by the two ruling political parties in their mutual understanding and acceptance. The agreement in power-sharing is not limited to political power but also the allocation of the public budget, shared corrupt behavior, and active prevention of accountability.

Cammett *et al*. (2019) argued that one of the features of resource-rich states is the low level of interaction between individuals and government combined with mistrust, which makes the regime less responsive and authoritarian. Therefore, it lessens the transparency and accountability of the government and widens corruption. Moreover, the abundance of the petrodollar that comes through rent highly alters the attitude of political elites who come to power. Additionally, capital gain from resource rents might encourage politicians to take dominance via pressure or limit election participation.

Auzer (2018) stated that political instability is a hampering factor to the economic growth in a rentier state. Oil revenue's lack of transparency and accountability leads to a long-lasting political dispute. Moreover, rentier states try to increase their oil revenue by selling it, which generates inequality within a society that leads to deepening social distrust of the government. Political instability might harm the economy of a resource-rich state due to the improper management of the oil revenue and neglected non-oil sector.

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5. Economic Factors in Rentier States

The dynamics of rentier states are significantly influenced by economic factors. States that are dependent on resources rely extensively on the exportation of natural resources, which can significantly affect government revenues, financial strategy, and liquidity. The instability of resource prices has the potential to result in fiscal shortfalls, the implementation of budget cuts, and economic tightening. Moreover, the phenomenon of Dutch Disease can result in the appreciation of a country's currency, thereby reducing the competitiveness of non-resource sectors in the global marketplace (Mohammed, *et al.,* 2022).

According to Neves (2014), Timor Leste's market process is an extractive state. He emphasized that the wealth extraction sector is strongly autonomous from the rest of the economy. Thus, the domestic economy produces just 10% of the country's GDP. The remaining funds come from the hydrocarbon industry. Relatively, GCC states are categorized as rentier states due to the availability of public employment and government subsidies (Ben-Salha & Zmami, 2021).

Insufficient economic diversification may result in inadequate investment and innovation in alternative industries. Economies that rely heavily on one particular sector, commonly referred to as rentier states, are prone to jeopardizing their long-term economic stability and prosperity. Comprehending these variables is imperative for scrutinizing the obstacles and prospects that rentier states encounter in attaining enduring economic growth, diminishing reliance on natural resources, fostering economic heterogeneity, and guaranteeing enduring stability. However, rentier states, may experience significant vulnerability to market fluctuations and external shocks (Al Naimi 2021). He also stated that although Saudi Arabia has been working on its economic diversification, it is still suffering from the impacts of resource curse. These effects are corruption, patronage system, low level of political interest groups, and weak incentives for population to get involved in private sector.

Kaznacheev (2013) argued that the percentage of oil and gas exports to total exports and the proportion of hydrocarbon exports to GDP are the two main prevalent measures of resource abundance. The scholars stated that if natural resources account for more than 25% of a country's exports and the percentage of natural resources exports as a share of GDP is greater than 10%, the state is entirely dependent on natural resources. To understand the measurement, see Table 1.

Table (1): The two main prevalent measures of resource abundance in selected countries, 2017.

Country	The percentage of natural resources exports as a share of GDP	The percentage of fuel export as a share of merchandise
Germany	0.1	2
Norway	5.8	57
Iraq	42.4	96
Iran	16.0	63

Source: United Nations, 2019.

According to Table 1, Germany is a developed state with a low level of natural resource-dependent. In 2017, the share of fuel export was only 2% of its overall merchandise export. Moreover, the percentage of natural resources exports as a share of GDP is equivalent to 0.1%. Norway is another developed country with a high level of natural resources, which does not rely highly on its natural resource revenues. The share of its fuel export reaches 57% of its merchandise exports but does not contribute more than 10% to their GDP.

Iraq is a developing state entirely dependent on its natural resources rent. In 2017, 96% of its overall export included fuel exports. Thus, the percentage of natural resources exports as a share of GDP was 42.4%, which confirms the rentier feature of the country. Likewise, Iran's export percentage of gas and oil was 63% in 2017. Nonetheless, the proportion of hydrocarbon exports was 16% of its overall GDP.

Some other studies have suggested different measurements toward a rentier state. Hasan and Perot (2021) highlighted that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is a semi-autonomous region within Iraq that sells its oil independently. They have empirically investigated the association between *rentiers* and KRI. The scholars have argued that a country is a rentier state if they have four characteristics. First, a country with a high share of rent to its GDP is classified as a rentier state. Second, the significant Petro-dollar obtains from a foreign government, entity, or individual. Third, the oil wealth is distributed to a minor group of high officials, and the rest of society becomes a

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consumer. Fourth, the government should be the primary receiver of foreign rents. Therefore, based on these four characteristics, they have concluded that KRI can be classified as a rentier state.

6. Governance in Rentier States

According to Kaufmann *et al.* (2010), governance is the institutions and frameworks that drive a government in a country. The researchers have classified the evaluation of governance into three categories. The three category indicators consist of the following:

1. The procedure of government selection and observation,
2. The capability of a government to exercise rational policies,
3. The citizens' perspective regarding the institutions that run the government.

Moreover, they have introduced a particular methodology to describe the governance quality of a country. A government that ranks close to 100 is more effective and accountable than those close to 0. According to Figure 1, developed states like Germany and Norway are more effective, transparent, and accountable in term of governance than those rentier states like Iraq and Iran.

Government entities in resource-rich states could be the principal contributor to a 'resource curse' or a 'resource blessing.' Reforming and developing legal and social organizations are critical. By guaranteeing investment in the hydrocarbons industry, reforms will guarantee better use of petroleum revenues. Likewise, it is highlighted that a tight association between the rule of law and economic growth in rentier states affects the quality of government entities (Al-Sarihi, and Cherni, 2022).

Benli Altunisik (2014) elaborated on how the Al-Saud regime monopolized the business sector's political officials. Likewise, Qadhafi in Libya changed the sociopolitical structure of the state through its type of regime called *Jamahiriya.* Similarly, with the increasing oil income in Iran in the mid-1970s, the Shah of Iran focused on reducing the capability of the Ulema (religious leaders), the landlords, and the Bazaar (business leaders) to impose his power. In contrast to the previous examples, the monarchs of Kuwait and Qatar have provided a significant share of oil revenue to their trader class —the most potent division— to terminate their political participation in the respective states.



Figure (1): Characterization of governance categories in selected countries, 2019.
Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2021.

The desire of rentier states to run their states in a non-democratic system is investigated by Monier (2023). The beforementioned study found that domestic dissatisfaction exists more in rentier states than in states lacking oil wealth. However, they have concentrated more on interpreting the tendency toward disputes in various political structures rather than describing the political products. However, the revenue from natural resources in a state boosts the influence of a regime and significantly deteriorates the relationship between society and government, increasing the lack of transparency and corruption.

Apergis and Ben Ali (2020) empirically investigate the impacts of investment and political stability on the connection between possible corruption and economic development. They have added that corruption always occurs during the interaction between business people, political officials, and authorities. Thus, policymakers must

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set policies to improve transparency and prevent such phenomena. (Hakimi & Hamdi 2016) analyzed the data of several countries in different parts of the world and discovered a solid positive link between corruption and economic growth through the investment channel. They added that the level of corruption differs from zone to country, and each country uses different methods to engage in corrupt activities.

In a particular case, Jameel (2017) shed light on the corruption of the KRI after 2003. He asserted that high officials of two ruling parties in the KRI abused their position in their parties' interests. These interests included supporting their parties' media with the government's wealth, providing well-paid jobs in the public sector for their supporters without performing, and distributing a massive amount of Kurdistan's public budget to their parties as subsidies. Furthermore, he believed these actions had substantially impacted the inefficient institutional development of the KRG.

7. The Interaction Between Economics and Politics in Rentier States

The interplay between politics and economics in rentier states is complex and characterized by mutual influence. The predominant dependence on income generated from natural assets, such as petroleum, minerals, or gas, significantly influences the economic strategies, political conditions, and institutional structures of these nations. The management and allocation of resource-derived revenues are pivotal for regulating the power and authority factors within states that rely on rent-based income. Having control over the distribution of resource earnings gives governments a huge financial buffer and bargaining advantage. The management of resource rents has the potential to facilitate the consolidation of political authority, the formation of patronage groups, and the manipulation of political decision-making mechanisms (Mitchell, and Gengler, 2019).

The creation and execution of fiscal strategies in rentier states are influenced by the state of politics. The economic policies of the government, encompassing areas such as taxation, strategies for investing, government expenditure targets, and subsidy services, are frequently shaped by political factors, power dynamics, and the imperative to sustain social equilibrium and political backing. The economic policies of a nation are influenced by political agents and their respective interests, which may have an effect on the overall economic progress and advancement of the country. The presence of resource rents in rentier states can have major consequences for the process of state-building and the establishment of political credibility. The efficacy of the state and its capacity to meet the societal agreement with the people are impacted by the sharing of assets and economic growth (Bull, and Rosales, 2020).

As previously indicated, the rentier bargain refers to a mutually agreed upon arrangement between the state and its populace. The maintenance of stability in the agreement is of utmost importance for ensuring political stability in states that rely on rentierism. The capacity of the government to deliver on its end of the agreement through the provision of economic advantages and social welfare initiatives has an impact on the social compact and political steadiness. The rentier bargain may be strained by changes in the allocation of resource rents or by recessions, which can spark social dissatisfaction and pose political problems. Moreover, in rentier states, external variables also have an impact on the link between politics and economy. The financial health and politics of rentier states can be influenced by world market circumstances, global energy prices, and geopolitical factors or global sanctions (Seign-goura, 2023).

The influence of political elements on economic strategies is noteworthy in all nations, including those classified as rentier states. The course and targets of fiscal policies are influenced by the philosophy and policy outlook of the governing party or government. The maintenance of policy consistency and the provision of a favorable environment for the economy are based upon political consistency and stability of strategies. Additionally, the application of influencing by interest groups is a multifaceted phenomenon, involving a diverse array of groups including corporations, labor unions, and special interest groups. When crafting economic policy, political actors often take these groups' needs and interests into account (Sadeghi Amroabadi, 2022).

Electoral aspects produce considerable impact on political parameters, especially in democratic systems. This phenomenon may result in the formulation of policies that adhere to short-term gains and public approval at the expense of long-term economic viability. Moreover, the economic strategies of rentier states can be influenced by

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power dynamics and elite desires, whereas global factors and international relations can also play a role in shaping economic policy decisions. Recognizing the influence of political variables on the economy is crucial for evaluating the efficacy and consequences of said strategies. This emphasizes the demand for accountable and open administration, collaborative decision-making processes, and structures for governance that take social welfare and long-term economic sustainability into consideration (Dizaji, 2022).

Croissant (2022) argued that governments face a significant challenge in balancing economic interests and political stability, especially in rentier states. These states heavily rely on natural resources, which can lead to economic imbalances and political vulnerabilities. In order to attain equilibrium, it is imperative for governments to give priority to economic diversification, transparent administration of resource earnings, open fiscal policies, and investment in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and welfare initiatives. The act of diversification serves to mitigate economic risks and bolster stability through the establishment of supplementary revenue streams and employment prospects. The implementation of transparent revenue administration procedures can foster public confidence, minimize critiques, and minimize the potential for political unrest. The formulation of economic policies that are inclusive in nature is imperative for the promotion of sustainable development and the mitigation of inequality in society.

Adjusting financial goals and a stable politics necessitates the inclusion of several vital elements, such as collaborative decision-making, strategic planning, institutional ability building, and tackling disputes and social difficulties. The consultative techniques encourage communication, consensus-building, and fiscal strategies that respect various demands and thoughts. The reduction of economic instability and the attraction of both local and international investors may be achieved via proactive planning and the strengthening organizational capacity. Mitigating social unrest and promoting political stability can be achieved through the resolution of societal problems and the tackling of social difficulties (Hertog, 2022).

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8. Conclusion

Following the rentier state paradigm, a state may be considered rentier if renter income dominates the national economy while there is a weak domestic producing sector. Just a tiny portion of the population plays a role in producing rent, which is mainly received by the state. In rentier nations, politics and economics engage in a complicated and powerful manner that has substantial socioeconomic implications. This reliance has a significant impact on the economy, politics, and systems of governance. Economic policies are heavily influenced by political variables such as political ideology, stability, interest group impact, electoral concerns, balance of power, and foreign connections. The private sector’s function is undervalued, and economic diversity is rarely noticeable in rentier regimes. The task of reconciling financial goals and stable politics constitutes an important challenge in rentier states. This requires the implementation of measures such as diversified economy, transparent governance of resource income, adoption of open economic strategies, consultative decision-making, long-term strategy, and tackling social issues. This relationship has various socioeconomic implications such as disparities in income, import dependency, restricted job opportunities, Dutch Disease, rent-seeking, corruption, influence on social services and infrastructure, as well as governance and overall quality of institutions. In rentier nations, recognizing and resolving the complicated relationship between economics and politics is crucial to sustainable development and inequality reduction.

This study found out that knowing the interaction between politics and economics in rentier states is essential to appreciate these nations' dynamics and creating successful strategies. In states where income is mainly derived from rent, it is crucial to consider the relationship between politics and economics. This involves addressing key factors such as balancing the interests of political figures, promoting a fair economy for all, ensuring transparency and accountability in handling resource profits, and expanding the economy beyond the resource sector. To effectively deal with the dangers and possibilities arising from the interplay between economics and politics in rentier states, it is imperative for policymakers and stakeholders to consider the discovered factors.

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کارلێکی نێوان ئابووری و سیاسەت لە دەوڵەتانی کرێچیدا

پوختە:

لەو ویلایەتانەی کە داهات بە شێوەیەکی سەرەکی لە کرێ وەرگیراوە، زۆر گرنگە پەیوەندی نێوان سیاسەت و ئابووری لەبەرچاو بگیرێت. زانینی کارلێکی نێوان سیاسەت و ئابووری لە دەوڵەتانی کرێچیدا زۆر گرنگە بۆ قەدرزانینی داینامیکی ئەم گەلانە و دروستکردنی ستراتیژی سەرکەوتوو. ئەم توێژینەوەیە بە شێوەیەکی بەرفراوان پەیوەندی ئاڵۆزی نێوان سیاسەت و ئابووری لە ویلایەتە کرێنشینەکاندا دەکۆڵێتەوە، لەگەڵ جەختکردنەوەیەکی تایبەت لەسەر ئەوەی کە چۆن ئەم داینامیکییە کاریگەری لەسەر حوکمڕانی، ستراتیژییە ئابوورییەکان و گەشەی ئابووری کۆمەڵایەتی هەیە. کارلێکی نێوان ئەم دوو بوارە کاریگەرییەکی بەرچاوی لەسەر خۆشگوزەرانی گشتی و بەردەوامیی ئەم گەلانە هەیە. شتێکی سەرەکی کە لەم لێکۆڵینەوەیەدا وەرگیراوە، پێویستییەکی گرینگە بۆ هاوسەنگکردنی هەوڵە ئابوورییەکان لەگەڵ سەقامگیری سیاسی، لە هەمان کاتدا ئاگاداربوون لە دەرئەنجامەکانی یاریی نێوان ئابووری و سیاسەت لەم گەلانەدا. توێژەران ڕێبازێکی چۆنایەتییان بەکارهێناوە و بە وردی کۆمەڵێک سەرچاوەی سەرەتایی و لاوەکی جۆراوجۆریان شیکردەوە، کە بووەتە هۆی چەندین دۆزینەوەی بەرچاو. جێی ئاماژەیە، توێژینەوەکە پەیوەندییەکی ئەرێنی بەرزی لە نێوان هۆکارە ئابووری و سیاسییەکان لە ویلایەتە کرێنشینەکاندا دۆزیەوە.

التفاعل بين الاقتصاد والسياسة في الدول الريعية

الملخص:

في الدول التي يُستمد فيها الدخل بشكل أساسي من الريع ، من الضروري النظر في العلاقة بين السياسة والاقتصاد. إن معرفة التفاعل بين السياسة والاقتصاد في الدول الريعية أمر ضروري لتقدير ديناميكيات هذه الدول وخلق استراتيجيات ناجحة. يستكشف هذا البحث على نطاق واسع العلاقة المعقدة بين السياسة والاقتصاد في الدول الريعية ، مع التركيز بشكل خاص على كيفية تأثير هذه الديناميكية على الحوكمة والاستراتيجيات الاقتصادية والنمو الاجتماعي والاقتصادي. يحمل التفاعل بين هذين المجالين آثارًا كبيرة على الرفاهية العامة واستدامة هذه الدول. تتمثل إحدى الوجبات الجاهزة الرئيسية من الدراسة في الحاجة الماسة إلى تحقيق التوازن بين المساعي الاقتصادية والاستقرار السياسي ، مع مراعاة نتائج التفاعل بين الاقتصاد والسياسة في هذه الدول.

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استخدم الباحثون نهجًا نوعيًا وقاموا بتحليل شامل لمجموعة متنوعة من المصادر الأولية والثانوية ، مما أدى إلى العديد من الاكتشافات المهمة. والجدير بالذكر أن الدراسة وجدت علاقة إيجابية عالية بين العوامل الاقتصادية والسياسية في الدول الريعية.