

An Analysis of Semantic Presupposition in Sherwood Anderson’s Short Story “BROTHERS”

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ABSTRACT

Semantic Presupposition is a kind of inference that sentences of natural languages may have. The semantic presupposition is associated with certain lexical items and particular grammatical constructions. A wide range of research has been conducted for explaining presupposition in various domains, the current study is trying to investigate semantic presupposition in the English short story ‘Brothers’ written by Sherwood Anderson through content analysis of the selected texts adopting Yule’s theory (1996) embedding Levinson’s classification of presupposition triggers (1983). Besides, it aims to find the most dominant type of semantic presupposition in the English short story ‘Brothers’ by calculating the types of presuppositions found in the short story. Accordingly, (4) texts have been selected from the English short story, then they were studied in terms of types of presupposition, namely existential, factive, lexical, non-factive, structural, and counter-factual. The results demonstrate that only five types of presuppositions are found in the short story and the total number of presuppositions occurring in the short story is (672) times. Besides, the analysis of the texts shows that the most frequently used presupposition type in the English short story was Existential which appeared (x`560) times or about (83.3%), and the factive presupposition is the least used type which appears (9) times or about (1.3%).

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of the Article

Frequently, people utilize language to communicate a message that expresses their feelings, opinions, and ideology when interacting with each other in society. Language is used by the writers in the form of writing to communicate their ideas and feelings about various circumstances and occurrences. Nevertheless, for narrating their stories, writers of short stories, through using presupposition, try to narrate what they have intended to convey from messages to readers in an economic way. By using presuppositions in their writings, their story becomes more successful and relevant.

This paper aims at examining the use of presupposition in the selected texts from the English short story 'Brothers' by Sherwood Anderson. It tries to answer the tackled questions:

- 1- How many types of presupposition triggers have been used in the English short story 'Brothers' by Sherwood Anderson?
- 2- What are the explications of the semantic presuppositions found in the English short story 'Brothers' by Sherwood Anderson?
- 3- What are the most used types of semantic presuppositions in this short story?

This research paper focuses on the types of presupposition and how they are used in the English short story 'Brothers'. First, general background information is given about semantic presupposition, how it is defined by various linguists, and its relation to the sentence structure and lexical items without considering the context. Then, it describes the types of presupposition triggers with examples. Secondly, the study is organized by extracting and evaluating various chunks of Anderson's short story according to the different types of presupposition triggers found in it. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion and references.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Semantic Presupposition

A presupposition is a concept used in both semantics and pragmatics to denote the implicit assumptions of the speakers and listeners that are required for the correct utterance interpretation (Finch, 2000, p.173). Cummins and Katsos (2019, p.84) claim that the common concept of presupposition is traced back to Frege (1892), who regarded the existence of an item having the property of a noun phrase within a specified description as a ‘Voraussetzung,’ or condition or precondition for the sentence containing the expression to be meaningful. Presupposition is what a speaker of a language assumes in communicating a particular sentence (Crystal, 2008, p.384). According to Kroeger, presupposition is a piece of information that is encoded linguistically as part of the common ground at the time of utterance, (2018, p.40). As well, Yule (2006) states “What a speaker (or writer) assumes is true or known by a listener (or reader) can be described as a presupposition” (P.117).

Consequently, Kroeger (2018, p.40) states that presupposition is a kind of inference, which is extremely common in daily speech. Presupposition is the belief that the reader must follow to understand the text (Griffiths, 2006, p.83).

Besides, the term ‘semantic presupposition’ refers to a relationship between sentences (Oualif, 2017, p.47). Stalnaker (1973, p.447) states that Strawson defined semantic presupposition as one sentence presupposing another sentence when the latter is true, the former will always have truth value. Later on, formally Strawson’s definition has been developed by Bas Van Fraassen, and Generative linguists have used this kind of definition such as Lakoff, Horn, and Karttunen. As well, Karttunen (1973, p.169) claims that according to the logician, Bas Van Fraassen (1968, 1969, 1971) presupposition is a semantic concept, defined in terms of truth and consequence. Sentence (a), semantically implies sentence (b), just in case (b) is true wherever (a) is true or false. In other words, (b)’s truth is a requirement for (a)’s bivalence. If (a) implies (b) and (b) is false, then (a) is neither true nor false: it is either truthless or has an unknown third truth value.

Furthermore, Saeed (2009, p.103) has formulated a truth table for identifying a semantic relation for presupposition between two sentences, demonstrated below: -

Table (1): The truth relation for Presuppositions

<u>p</u>	<u>q</u>
T	→ T
F	→ T
T or F	← T

(Saeed, 2009, p. 103)

So, according to the table (1) if p ‘the presupposing sentence’ is true, then q ‘the presupposed sentence’ is true. If p is false, then q is still true. If q is true, then p could be either true or false.

Considering example (1) below and its presupposition (1b) to show the semantic relationship between the sentences in (1a and 1b), and represent it as a truth relation.

(1) a. “John’s brother has just got back from Texas”.

>> b. “John has a brother.”

(Saeed, 2009, p.103)

If it is true that **John’s brother has returned from Texas**, then **John** must have a brother. Similarly, even if it is incorrect that **John’s brother has returned from Texas** (if, for example, he is still there), the presumption that **John has a brother** remains. Finally, even if it is true that **John has a brother**, it is unknown, and it tells nothing about whether or not he has returned from Texas (Saeed, 2009, p.103). Only sentences, not people, presume anything (Karttunen, 1973, p.169).

2.2 Types of Presupposition Triggers:

Presupposition triggers are grammatical constructions or words that show the existence of a presupposition (Kroeger, 2018, p.40). The existence of particular words creates many sentence presuppositions. Linguists referred to these words as lexical triggers (Finch, 2000, p.174 and Huang, 2014, p.86). Presuppositions appear to be

associated with lexical items or, more broadly, components of surface structure. Such linguistic items that generate presuppositions are called presupposition triggers. Writers and speakers use these linguistic phrases known as presupposition triggers, which allow them to express intended knowledge without directly mentioning it (Levinson, 1983, p.179).

However, Levinson (1983) has listed thirteen types of presupposition triggers:

Definite descriptions, factive verbs, implicative verbs, change of state verbs, iteratives, verbs of judging, temporal clauses, cleft sentences, implicit clefts with stressed constituents, comparisons and contrasts, non-restrictive relative clauses, counterfactual conditionals, and questions (pp.181-184).

While Yule (1996, pp. 27-30) has classified presuppositions into six main types, they are existential presuppositions, factive presuppositions, lexical presuppositions, non-factive presuppositions, structural presuppositions, and counterfactual presuppositions.

In this study, the most typical triggers introduced by Yule (1996) are adopted, and among them embedding those types that are mentioned by Levinson (1983, pp.181-184), which can be utilized as indicators that a presupposition exists.

2.2.1 Existential Presupposition Trigger

The existential presupposition is a type of presupposition that refers to the existence of a specific entity. It occurs more broadly in any definite noun phrase, for example, “*the king of Sweden, the cat, the girl next door, the Counting Crows*” (Yule, 1996, p. 27). Similarly, Kroeger (2018, p.43) states that the use of a definite single noun phrase, such as ‘*Bertrand*’ and Russell's famous example of ‘*the King of France*’, implies that there is an identifiable figure in the context under consideration who matches that description. Consider the following examples:

(2) a. “The University of Oxford”.

>> b. There is a university is famous at Oxford”.

(Allwood, Andersson and Dahl, 1977, p. 150)

(3) a. John saw every student.

>> b. John does exist.

(Chierchia, 1995, p. 237).

The noun phrases and the proper names in the above examples in (2a, and 3a) hold existential presuppositions.

The possessive constructions in English, most obviously, give rise to a presupposition of existence. Using a possessive phrase (as my cat) implies the existence of the possessed entity (Kroeger, 2018, p.43).

The existential presupposition is also called definite descriptions, sentences that refer a property to a specific item almost always assume that the thing in the discussion exists. As a result, existential presuppositions are common in natural-language discussions, (Allwood, Andersson and Dahl, 1977, p.150).

(4) a. “The pizzeria in the Vatican is closed on Sundays.”

>> b. “There is a pizzeria in the Vatican”.

(Huang, 2014, p. 180).

(5) a. “Fafnir's car is red.”

>> b. “Fafnir does exist.”

>> c. “Fafnir has a car”.

(Allwood, Andersson and Dahl, 1977, p. 150)

2.2.2 Factive Presupposition Trigger

Factive presuppositions emerge in sentences containing predicates that express factual features or relations (Allwood, Andersson and Dahl, 1977, p. 150). Factive verbs are a class of verbs that presume the truth of their complement clauses (Finch, 2000, p.174; Saeed, 2009, p.107; Geurt, 2017, p.180). Yule (1996, p.27) considers that factive presupposition is presupposed information that follows a verb such as *know*.

The heterogeneous collection of factive verbs and adjectives include: “*Know, significant, aware, odd, tragic, exciting, agree, relevant, matters, counts, makes sense, suffices, amuses, bothers, show, resent, regret, take into consideration, be a shame, be surprising, be in mind, acknowledge, demonstrate, take into account, realize, insist, force, explain, depressing, be happy, be glad, be furious, be sad, be delighted, be disappointed, admit, discover, find out, notice, observe, confess*” (Parker and Riley, 2005, p. 48; Karttunen, 2016, p. 710; Leech, 1981. P. 332, Griffiths, 2006, p. 145).

By using these expressions, the truth of the presupposition is kept in negation, questioning, and conditional antecedents (Karttunen, 2016, p.711). Birner (2013, p.154) states that factive verbs are those that take a sentential complement and presuppose it, consider the following examples:

- (6) a. “As time went on, people began to *notice* that Frodo also showed signs of good preservation”.
>> b. “Frodo showed signs of good preservation.”

(Birner, 2013, p.154)

- (7) a. “Jack *regrets/ doesn’t regret* that he cheated at the test.”
>> b. “Jack cheated at the test”.

(Geurts, 2017, p. 180)

Thus, in (6a), the verb 'notice' serves as a trigger that its sentential complement is presupposed as in (6b). While in (7) the verb 'regret' likewise serves as a trigger indicating that(7b) is presupposed. So, the affirmative and the negative form of them have the same presuppositions in which they oblige the speaker to the truth of that-clause.

- (8) a. “Does it *count* that I celebrated every inch of you?”
>>b. “He celebrated every inch of him.”

(Karttunen, 2016, p.711)

- (9) a. “It *matters/doesn’t matter* they lied to us”.

>> b. “They lied to us.”

(Griffiths, 2006, p. 145)

It can be observed that in (8a &9a) as different forms of sentences, equally, the speaker confidentially convinces the recipient of the truth of the predicates, that is (8b & 9b).

2.2.3 Non-Factive Presupposition Trigger

In this type of presupposition there are some phrases that are presupposing what comes in the sentence is not true, in other words, they are presupposing the falsity of the information in the sentence (Kamal, 2009, 105). Yule (1996, p.29) claims that non-factive presupposition is that kind that assumes not to be true.

The verbs that indicate this type of presuppositions are: ‘*dream*’, ‘*imagine*’, ‘*pretend*’, ‘*likely*’, ‘*wish*’, ‘*sure*’, ‘*possible*’, ‘*true*’, ‘*false*’, ‘*seems*’, ‘*appears*’, ‘*happens*’, ‘*chances*’, ‘*turns out*’, ‘*assume*’, ‘*believe*’, ‘*change*’, ‘*claim*’, ‘*want*’, etc.) (Yule, 1996, p. 29 and Leech, 1981, p. 303).

(10) a. “We imagined we were in Dubai.”

>>b. “We were not in Dubai.”

(Ayumi, 2020, 101)

(11) a. “John *wished* to read Mary’s letter”.

>> b. “John did not read Mary’s letter”.

(Leech, 1981, pp. 301-302)

The use of the verb ‘*imagined*’ in (10) and ‘*wished*’ in (11) demonstrates that the sentence after the verbs ‘*pretends* and *wished*’ are false. So, in (10b) it makes the presupposition “we were not in Dubai”. And in (11b) introduces the presupposition that “John did not read Mary’s letter”. As a result, the information immediately following the words ‘*pretend and wished*’ is false.

2.2.4 Counterfactual Presupposition Trigger

In semantics, the phrase "counterfactual" refers to a sort of conditional statement that relates to a completely hypothetical situation. A counterfactual presupposition means what is presupposed is not only false, but is the opposite of what is true, or 'contrary to facts', counterfactuals are usually contrasted with real conditional statements, for example

(12) a. "If you had not written that letter, I would not have to fire you."

>> b. "The hearer did write that letter".

(Kroeger, 2018, p.43)

(13) a. "If Hannibal had only twelve more elephants, the Romance languages would not exist this day".

>> b. "Hannibal didn't have twelve more elephants".

(Levinson, 1983, p.184)

Simply, structures like "*If you had not written that letter,...*", and "*If Hannibal had only twelve more elephants*" are called a counterfactual conditional, because they presuppose that information in the if-clauses is not true at the time of utterance.

2.2.5 Lexical Presupposition Triggers

It is another set of verbs that functions as presupposition triggers. In this class, the usage of a form with its specific meaning is generally interpreted with the presumption that another (non-asserted) information is understood (Yule, 1996, p.258). Lexical presuppositions include **implicative verbs**: *manage, ought to, forget, remember, avoid, happen, etc.*; **change of state verbs**: *stop, start, begin, continue, finish, carry on, cease, take, leave, enter, come, go, arrive, etc.*; **iteratives**: *again, another, anymore, returned, another time, repeat, restore, for the nth time*; and **verbs of judging**: *accuse, criticize, blame, praise, confess, forgive, justify, excuse, etc.* (Levinson, 1983, pp.181-182; Grundy, 2000, pp. 122-123).

Consider the following examples: -

Presuppositions triggered by *implicative verbs*:

(14) a. “John *forgot* to lock the door.”

>> b. “John ought to have locked or intended to lock the door.”

(Levinson, 1983, p. 181)

Presuppositions triggered by the *change of state verbs*:

(15) a. “Mary has/hasn’t *stopped* beating her boyfriend.”

>> b. “Mary has been beating her boyfriend”.

(Huang, 2014, p. 87)

Presuppositions triggered by *iteratives*:

(16) a. “You’re late *again*.”

>> b. “You were late before.”

(Yule, 1996, p. 28)

2.2.6 Structural Presupposition Trigger

Structural presuppositions are types of presuppositions in which part of a sentence structure is assumed to be true conventionally. Such structures can be used by addressers to treat information as presupposed i.e., it is considered to be true and hence accepted as true by the addressee (Khaleel, 2010, p.533). Structural presupposition includes (cleft constructions, comparative constructions, time adverbial clauses, non-restrictive clauses, and questions). Consider the following examples: -

(17) a. “It was his behavior with frogs that disgusted me.” (**It- Cleft**)

(18) a. “What disgusted me was his behavior with frogs.” (**Pseudo- cleft**)

>> b. “Something disgusted me”.

(Saeed, 2009, p. 106).

Here, both (17) which is (it-cleft), and (18) which is (pseudo-cleft) share the same presupposition that there is “something disgusted me”.

(19) a. “Carol is /isn't a better linguist than Barbara”. (**Comparative construction**)

>> b. “Barbara is a linguist”.

(Levinson, 1983, p.183)

(20) a. “I was riding motorcycles *before* you learned to walk” (**Adverbial clause**)

>>b. “You learned to walk”.

(Saeed, 2009, p. 106).

It is clear that in (19 & 20) the presuppositions are produced through comparative construction in (19) to presuppose (19b) and the adverbial clause of time in (20a) to presuppose (20b).

(21) a. “John, who auctioned the vase, had previously met the antiquarian.” (**Non-restrictive relative clause**)

>>b. “John auctioned the vase”.

(Castillo, 2003, p.

27)

In (21) the additional parenthetical information “*who auctioned the vase*” is not affected by the negation of the primary verb outside the relative clause and hence gives rise to presupposition.

Subsequently, questions are divided into three types: Wh-questions, yes/no questions, and alternative questions, which are illustrated below.

1. Wh-questions assume the presence of an entity that can answer the question or what the speaker expects of such an entity (Beaver, 1997, p.943). Using Wh-question introduces a presupposition that what comes after the Wh-question word is regarded as the truth (Khaleel, 2010, P. 533).

(22) a. “When did he leave? “

>> b. “He left.”

(23) a. “Where did you buy the bike?”

>> b. “You bought the bike.”

(Yule,1996, p.29)

Furthermore, Levinson (1983, p.184) states that presuppositions can be obtained by replacing the Wh- forms with the corresponding existentially quantified variable, such as ‘who’ by someone, ‘where’ by somewhere, ‘how’ by somehow, etc. the presuppositions of this type are not invariant to negation. Consider the following example.

(24) a. “who bought the badminton set?”

>> b. “Someone has bought the badminton set”

(Fromkin, Rodman, and Hyams, 2011, p. 216)

(25) a. “Who is the professor of linguistics at MIT?”

>> b. “Someone is the professor of linguistics at MIT”

(Levinson, 1983, p. 184)

2. Yes/no questions, generally, contain null presuppositions, which are the disjunction of their potential answers. The presupposition of this type of question is not affected by negation, (Levinson, 1983, p.184) as in (26).

(26) a. “Is there a professor of linguistics at MIT?”

>> b. “Either there is a professor of linguistics at MIT or there isn't”

(Levinson, 1983, p. 184)

3. Alternative questions, as in (27), imply the disjunction of their answers, but this type of presupposition is non-vacuously, (Levinson,1983, p.184) such as:

(27) a. “Is Newcastle in England or is it in Australia?”

>> b Newcastle is in England or Newcastle is in Australia”.

3. Methodology

This section deals with the method, the data collection, and the sample of analysis. It also presents the model adopted.

3.1 Method and Sample

In this research, the researcher uses a mixed-method involving both qualitative and quantitative procedures to describe and analyze the data and obtain the data results. The data are gathered from the short story “Brothers” by Sherwood Anderson in “Certain Things Last. The Selected Short Stories of Sherwood Anderson” edited and introduced by Modlin (1992).

3.2 Model and The Procedure of Analysis

The data is analyzed using two mixed theories. For counting and identifying types of presuppositions it depends on Yule’s theory (1996). While indicating the form of triggers that triggers the type of presupposition, it uses Levinson’s classification of triggers (1983).

Consequently, the short story is read and the types of presuppositions found in the short story are counted one by one manually. Then, five texts are chosen randomly, below each text, a summary of the text is given. Then sentences of the selected texts are analyzed one by one according to Yule’s (1996) and Levinson’s (1983) theories for types of presuppositions and forms of triggers respectively. In addition, giving a brief discussion for each presupposition within the selected text.

After analyzing the selected texts, the frequencies and percentages of the types of presuppositions in the whole story are summarized in a table. As far as counting the percentages is concerned, a descriptive statistical way is applied since the researcher proposes a formula based on the number of presuppositions of each presupposition

type individually, multiplied by 100 and then divided by the total number of presuppositions. The formula is summarized as follows:

The number of presupposition types $\times 100 \div$ Total Number of presuppositions.

After obtaining the frequencies and percentages of presupposition types the results will be discussed, compared, and concluded.

4. Analysis of selected data in Anderson’s Short story ‘Brothers’.

This section studies the English short story “Brothers” by Sherwood Anderson to find and explain the types of semantic presuppositions used in the selected data from the story. Besides, it finds the most used presupposition triggers in the selected English short story. The analyzed texts of the short story are chosen randomly according to various types of presuppositions used in the short story.

The story talks about mankind’s loneliness, and it is narrated in the first person by an unnamed narrator who lives alone in the country near Chicago. The season is autumn, many mornings the narrator meets an old man who lives alone and people called him insane. The narrator and the old man are living in a forest and open plains which is cut off from the rest of the world. They live a life of routine, doing the same things over and over again. The old man has told the narrator about his brothers, sisters, his aunts, uncles, cousins, and brothers-in-law. They are reading Chicago’s daily newspapers which are filled with stories. The tale of a millionaire who got into difficulty with his wife after an affair with an actress. Another story of a man, who has killed his wife. The texts are taken randomly. The sentences that contain presuppositions are selected, and the triggers are italicized and then analyzed one by one.

Text (1)

“The man, who is now on trial in the courts and will no doubt be hanged, worked in a bicycle factory where he was a foreman, and lived with his wife and his wife’s mother in an apartment in Thirty-Second Street”.

Here the narrator tells the story which was written in the daily Chicago newspaper. It is about a man who has killed his wife and because of his sin, he had been on trial. It

talks about the place of his work and his living. To find the presupposition triggers in this context it is analyzed as follows: -

(1) “*The man, who is now on trial in the courts and will no doubt be hanged, worked...*”.

>>a. There was a man.

>>b. The man is on trial in the courts and he will be hanged.

>>c. There exists a court.

The writer of the story has presented three presuppositions in this sentence. The existential presuppositions in (1a & 1c) are triggered by definite descriptions of ‘the man’ and ‘the court’ to presuppose the existence of the man who has killed his wife and (1c) to presuppose that there is a court in the city. Whereas the presupposition in (1b) is structural and is triggered by a non-restrictive relative clause, the negation of the primary verb outside the relative clause does not affect the additional parenthetical information “***who is now on trial in the courts and will no doubt be hanged,***” producing a presupposition to give additional information that the man is on trial and he will be hanged.

(2) “*...worked in a bicycle factory where he was a foreman, and lived with his wife and his wife's mother in an apartment in Thirty-Second Street*”.

>>a. There is a bicycle factory.

>>b. There exists a foreman.

>>c. The man has a wife.

>>d. The wife has a mother.

>>e. There is an apartment.

>>f. There exists a street called Thirty-Second.

The presuppositions in (2) are all existential because they are triggered by indefinite descriptions (a bicycle, a foreman & an apartment) in (2a, 2b & 2e) to tell about the existence of these places. As well, (2c & 2d) are triggered by possessive pronouns to presuppose that the man has a wife and a mother-in-law. The last one (2f) is triggered by the proper noun 'Thirty-Second' to give information about the place of the apartment.

Text (2):

"He looked at her as one might look at a star or across a country of low hills in October when the leaves of the trees are all red and yellow gold. "She is a pure, virginal thing," he thought vaguely. "What can she be thinking about as she sits there by the window at work?"

This context again relates to the murderer and talks about his feeling toward the girl with whom he had fallen in her love. The types of presuppositions in this context are non-factive, existential, and structural, they are shown below: -

(3) "He looked at her *as* one might look at *a star* or across *a country of low hills* in *October* when the leaves of *the trees* are all red and yellow gold".

>>a. The man was not looking at a star or across a country of low hills in October.

>>b. There is a star.

>>c. There exists a country of low hills.

>>d. The month is October.

>>e. The leaves of the trees were all red and yellow gold.

The presuppositions detected in (3) are non-factive, existential, and structural presuppositions. The presupposition in (3a) is non-factive and it is triggered by 'as', which implies that the information coming after 'as' is not true that is he was not looking at a star and she was not a star. As well, the presupposition in (3b, 3c, and 3d) are existential and they are triggered by 'a star, a country of low hills, and proper noun October'. Whereas the presupposition in (3e) is structural and it is triggered by the

adverbial clause ‘when’ to presuppose the time when the leaves of trees became red and yellow gold.

(4) “She is a pure, virginal thing," he *thought* vaguely”.

>>a. The girl was not pure, virginal thing.

The type of presupposition in (4a) is non-factive and it is triggered by the non-factive verb ‘thought’ which presupposes the opposite of the truth that she is not a pure and virginal thing.

(5) “*What* can she be thinking about *as* she sits there by *the window* at work?”.

>> a. She was thinking about something.

>>b. The girl sits by the window at work.

>>c. There was a window.

The presupposition in (5a and 5b) are structural presuppositions, (5a) is triggered by the question word ‘*what*’, the situation is already known before that question is asked, while (5b) is triggered by temporal clause ‘*as*’ to show the assumption that she is sitting by the window. And the presupposition in (5c) is existential, which is triggered by the definite description ‘*the window*’ to presuppose the existence of the window at work.

Text (3)

“After dinner he, with his wife, went to a picture show. When they came home his wife's mother sat under an electric light reading. There were two children and his wife expected another. They came into the apartment and sat down.”

Here, the writer tries to show the man’s life with his wife and his mother-in-law. How they spend their time with each other in the apartment. The types of presuppositions found are structural, existential, and lexical and they are demonstrated as follows: -

(6) “*After* dinner he, with *his wife*, went to a picture show”.

>> a. The man had dinner with his wife.

- >> b. The man has a wife.
- >>c. They were not at a picture show.
- >>d. There was a picture show.

The presupposition in (6a) is structural and is triggered by the adverbial clause ‘*after*’. While the presuppositions in (6b & 6d) are existential (6b) is triggered by possessives ‘*his wife*’ and (6d) is triggered by indefinite description ‘*a picture show*’. As well, the presupposition in (6c) is lexical, which is triggered by the change of state verb ‘*went*’ to presuppose that they were not at a picture show.

(7) “*When they came home his wife’s mother sat under an electric light reading*”.

- >> a. They came home.
- >>b. They were not at home.
- >> c. His wife had a mother.
- >> d. There was electric light.

The presupposition in (7a) is structural and it is triggered by the adverbial clause ‘*when*’. The presupposition in (7b) is lexical and it is triggered by the change of state verb ‘*came*’ to presuppose that they were not at home. At the same time (7a) presupposes (7b). The presuppositions in (7c & 7d) are existential (7c) is triggered by possessives ‘*wife’s mother*’ and (7d) is triggered by indefinite description ‘*an electric light*’.

(8) “*They came into the apartment and sat down*”.

- >>a. They were not in the apartment.
- >>b. There exists an apartment.

The type of presupposition in (8a) is lexical and it is triggered by the change of state verb ‘*came*’ to presuppose that they were not at home. While the presupposition in (8b) is existential, it is triggered by the definite description ‘*the apartment*’ to presuppose the existence of the apartment.

Text (4)

“The girl at the factory knew the foreman had fallen in love with her and the thought excited her a little. Since her aunt's death, she had gone to live in a rooming house and had nothing to do in the evening”.

Text (4) is about the girl, and how she thinks about the man who has fallen in her love. It also talks about the place of her life. The types of presuppositions found in this text are existential, factive, and structural presuppositions.

(8) “*The girl at the factory knew the foreman had fallen in love with her and the thought excited her a little*”.

>>a. There was a girl.

>>b. There existed a factory.

>>c. There was a foreman.

>>d. The foreman had fallen in love with her.

The type of presupposition in (9a, 9b, and 9c) are existential and they are triggered by definite noun phrases ‘the girl, the factory, and the foreman’ and presuppose the existence of these entities. Hence the presupposition in (9d) is factive and it is triggered by the factive verb ‘knew’ presupposing the fact that the foreman had fallen with her love.

(10) “*Since her aunt's death she had gone to live in a rooming house and had nothing to do in the evening*”.

>>a. The girl's aunt has died.

>>b. The girl had an aunt.

>>c. She had not been living in a rooming house before.

>>d. There was a rooming house.

The types of presuppositions in (10) are structural, existential, and lexical. The structural presupposition in (10a) is triggered by the temporal clause ‘since’ to presuppose that the girl's aunt has died. Then presuppositions in (10b & 10d)) are

existential, (10b) is triggered by possessives ‘her aunt’s death’, and (10d) is triggered by indefinite description ‘a rooming house’ which presupposes the existence of the place of living. While the lexical presupposition in (10c) is triggered by the change of state verb ‘gone’ to presuppose that she was not living in a rooming house before.

Text (5):

“As he walked beside me he launched into a long tale concerning a life he and his brother, who had now become a murderer, had once lived together. "He is my brother," he said over and over, shaking his head. He seemed afraid I would not believe. There was a fact that must be established. "We were boys together, that man and I," he began again”.

In this context, the narrator talks about himself when one early morning he went for a long walk through the hill country. As he was returning from the lowlands into their hill country, he met the old man whose family has so many strange ramifications. The old man began a long story about life he and his brother, who had now become a murderer.

(11) “As he walked beside me he launched into *a long tale* concerning *a life* he and his brother, *who had now become a murderer*, had once lived together.”

- >>a. The old man walked beside the narrator.
- >>b. There was a long tale.
- >>c. the old man has a brother.
- >>d. The old man’s brother had now become a murderer.
- >>e. His brother was not murdered before.
- >>f. There was a murderer.

Sentence (11) is a complex sentence that embodies many presuppositions as structural, existential, and lexical presuppositions. The types of presuppositions in (11a & 11d) are structural presuppositions, (11a) is triggered by temporal clause ‘as’ which presupposes that the man had walked beside the narrator and (11d) is triggered by non-restrictive relative clause ‘*who had now become a murder*’ presents the presupposition that the old man’s brother became a murder. The writer has used

this type of presupposition to give further information about the man and the parenthetical information is not affected by negating the main verb. While the existential presuppositions in (11b, 11c, and 11f) which presupposes the existence of the man who had killed his wife triggered by definite description possessive pronoun '*his brother*', in (11b & 11f) the indefinite descriptions '*a long tale and a murder*' presuppose the existence of these entities. Furthermore, the lexical presupposition in (11e) is triggered by the change of state verb '*became*' which introduces the presupposition that the old man's brother was not a killer before.

(12) . "He is *my brother*," he said over and over, shaking *his head*".

>>a. The old man had a brother.

>>b. He had a head.

These presuppositions are existential to presuppose that the old man had a brother and a head. They are both triggered by the possessive pronoun '*his*'.

(13) "He *seemed* afraid I would not believe. There was *a fact* that must be established. "We were boys together, that man and I," he *began* again."

>> a. He was not afraid in fact'.

>>b. There existed a fact.

>>c. He had begun before.

This sentence includes non-factive, existential, and lexical presuppositions. The presupposition in (13a) is non-factive and it is triggered by the verb '*seemed*' to presuppose that the old man was not truly afraid that the narrator would not believe the story about his brother. Whereas the presupposition in (13b) is existential which presupposes the existence of a fact, it is triggered by an indefinite description of '*a fact*'. While in (13c) the presupposition is lexical, and it is triggered by iterative '*again*' to presuppose that the old man had begun talking about his brother before.

4.1 Findings

Depending on the analysis of the short story and calculating the types of presupposition triggers used in the whole short story, the study comes up with the findings demonstrated in table (2) below: -

Table (2) Types of Presupposition Found in the English Short Story ‘Brothers’ by Sherwood Anderson.

No.	Types of Presuppositions	Frequency	Percentage
1	Existential Presuppositions	560	83.3 %
2	Factive Presuppositions	9	1.3%
3	Lexical Presuppositions	32	4.7%
4	Non-factive Presuppositions	24	3.5%
5	Structural Presuppositions	47	6.99%
6	Counterfactual Presuppositions	0	0%
	Total	672	100%

Based on the analysis the researcher has found that presuppositions are important in the short story; many texts are composed based on the presupposition sentences so that the reader becomes more interested to read. Adopting Yule’s classification of types of presuppositions, it can be realized that counterfactual presupposition has not been used in this short story, only five types of presuppositions are found. The most used type of presupposition in analyzing the English short story ‘Brothers’ by Anderson is existential which appeared (560) times or about (83.3%), it can be assumed that the entities exist, and the least used type is factive presupposition which appears (9) times or about (1.3%). The rate of using these types indicates that much of the story text was formulated to narrate and describe the characters and the scenes. So, the writer of ‘Brothers’ gives his views a sense of certainty.

Conclusions

In this study, the types of presuppositions and their triggers were discussed. The short story ‘Brothers’ by Sherwood Anderson was semantically studied as a semantic application of the issue of presuppositions. The sorts of presuppositions and presuppositional triggers were investigated, and after closely examining the English short story ‘Brothers’ and explaining the data analysis, the researcher came to the following conclusions:

- 1- It has been deduced that analyzing presupposition triggers effectively determines how short story writers attempt to attract and influence the reader's attention.
- 2- It was found that only five types of presuppositions were found in the story.

- 3- The story contains a variety of presuppositional triggers, and the total number of the used presupposition is (672).
- 4- Finally, after analyzing the data of the short story, the researcher noticed that the most dominant presupposition trigger is Existential (definite description) which occurred (560) times, contrary to the factive presupposition which occurred (9) times. This indicates that the writer tried to give more descriptions of the characters, events, and settings.

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شیکردنه‌وهی پیشگریمانه‌ی واتایی له کورته چیرۆکی 'براکان'ی شرود ئەندرسۆن

پوخته

پیشگریمانه‌ی واتایی جوړیکه له لیکه‌وته‌ی واتایی که ده‌کرئ پسته‌ی هر زمانیکی سروشتی هه‌بییت. به شیوه‌یه‌کی گشتی، پیشگریمانه‌ی واتایی تایبه‌تمه‌نده به باسکردنی کۆمه‌لیک دانه‌فهره‌نگیی و دارپشته‌ی ریزمانیی. سه‌ره‌پای ئەوه‌ی تووژینه‌وه‌ی زۆر ئەنجام‌دراون له‌باره‌ی پیشگریمانه‌کان له‌بوارێ جیا‌جیادا، ئەم تووژینه‌وه‌یه هه‌ول‌ده‌دات له‌پیشگریمانه‌ی واتایی بکوژیته‌وه له‌چیرۆکی ئینگلیزی (براکان) ی شیروود ئەندرسۆنی ئەمه‌ریکی له‌رێگه‌ی شیکردنه‌وه‌ی ناوه‌روکی تیکسته هه‌لبژێردراوه‌کان به‌پشت‌به‌ستن به‌تیۆری یۆل (۱۹۹۶) و سوودوه‌رگرتن له‌تیۆری لیفنسن (۱۹۸۳) بۆ پۆلینکردنی جوړی پیشگریمانه‌کان. مه‌به‌ست له‌م تووژینه‌وه‌یه بریتییبه له‌دۆزینه‌وه‌ ده‌ستنیشانکردنی جوړی هه‌ره‌باو و سه‌ره‌کی له‌رووی به‌کاره‌ینانی پیشگریمانه‌ی واتایی له‌چیرۆکی (براکان) له‌رێگه‌ی شیکردنه‌وه‌ی ئاماریی و ژماره‌یی بۆ هه‌موو ئەو پیشگریمانه‌یه‌ به‌کاره‌یندراون.

له نيو چيروكه كهدا چوار تيكتست هه لبژير دراون ئينجا تويزهر هه لساوه به جيا كرده وه و شيكرده وهى جوړه جياوازه كاني پيشگريمانه كان كه نه مانه ن: بوونى، راستى، ليكسيكى، ناراستى، رونائى، دژه-راستى نه. نه نجامه كاني نه م تويزينه وه به ده ريناخت كه پينج جوړى جياواز له پيشگريمانه له و چيروكه به كار هيندراون كه ژماره بان هه موويان پيكه وه 672 دانه بوو. به پي شيكرده وه كانيش ده كه وت كه پيشگريمانه ي جوړى بوونى له پله يه كه مدا ديت كه ژماره كه ي 670 دانه بوو كه ده كاته 83.3%، جوړى راستى له نزمترين ناستدا بوو له پرووى ژماره وه كه ته نها 9 دانه بوو به ريژه ي 1.3%.

تحليل الافتراض الدلالي في قصة قصيرة "الاخوة" للكاتب شروود اندرسن

الملخص

تعتبر الافتراض الدلالي المسبق احد انواع الاستدلال الذي قد يمتلكه الجمل في اللغات الطبيعية. للافتراض الدلالي المسبق ارتباط وثيق ببعض العناصر المعجمية و تركيبات نحوية معينة. لقد تمت اجراء بحوث كثيرة عن الافتراض الدلالي المسبق في مجالات مختلفة تهدف الدراسة الحالية الى البت في موضوع الافتراض الدلالي المسبق في قصة (الاخوة Brothers) للكاتب الامريكي الشهير شروود اندرسون عن طريق تحليل المحتوى بالاعتماد على نظرية يول (1996) و تصنيف ليفنسن (1983) لمحفات الافتراض المسبق. لغرض ايجاد و تحديد نوع الافتراض الدلالي الاكثر تكرارا و استخداما في القصة، تم اختيار اربعة نصوص من القصة. ثم قامت الباحثة بتاثير الافتراضات الدلالية المسبقة و تصنيفهم حسب النوع كالاتي: الوجودية و الحقيقي و المعجمية و غير الحقيقية و التركيبية و المضادة للحقيقة. بينت البحث استخدام خمسة انواع الافتراض الدلالي المسبق فقط في القصة و العدد الاجمالي كان 672 مرة. كما توصلت الي ان الافتراض الدلالي المسبق من نوع الوجودي كان الاكثر تكرارا حيث وصلت الي 560 مرة اي بنسبة 83.3% من المجموع الكلي بينما كان نوع الحقيقي الادنى تكرارا حيث وصلت الي 9 مرات فقط اي بنسبة 1.3% من المجموع الكلي.